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1Abstract
Essays on Workplace Consolidation and Labor Markets
by
Kevin Charles Todd
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Berkeley
Professor David E. Card, Chair
An important fact that has emerged from the past decade of research in labor economics
is that the identity of a worker’s employer is an important determinant of their labor market
outcomes. More recent work in the field has emphasized a correlation between consolidation
of industries and worse outcomes for workers employed in those industries. Both of these
findings are consistent with employers’ having substantive wage-setting power in the labor
market, a consideration that is at odds with standard competitive models of labor markets.
This dissertation contributes to the field of labor economics by providing empirical evi-
dence about how mergers and acquisitions — events that lead to changes in the identity of
a worker’s employer and which tend to increase the concentration of an industry — affect
labor markets. I do so in two complementary ways.
In the first chapter, which was coauthored with Jo¨rg Heining of the Institute for Em-
ployment Research (IAB) in Germany, I use matched employer-employee data from West
Germany to study how acquisitions — specifically the acquisition of an establishment by
another similar establishment close by — affect workers. Using an event study framework
with a control group of workers at unaffected plants, I find that acquisitions lead to em-
ployment losses for workers initially employed at the acquired (or “target”) firm, mainly
associated with labor force withdrawals by older female workers. At the same time I find
evidence of a rise in wages for workers initially employed at targets and at the acquiring
(or “buyer”) firm who remain with the combined enterprise, concentrated among lower-wage
workers. I interpret these findings as suggesting that consolidations lead to a reduction in
overall employment but a rise in rents per worker that lead to a pattern of losers and winners
in the labor market. The contribution of this chapter is that it is the first study to identify
establishment acquisitions and their impacts on workers who are directly impacted by them.
In the second chapter, I consider how merger and acquisition activity affects local labor
market aggregates. I examine how merger-driven consolidation of hospitals in different local
labor markets in the United States affected the wage and employment growth of Registered
Nurses (RNs). This chapter finds that MSAs where there was merger activity had higher
rates of growth in hospital market concentration than markets that did not. I find that
2the reduced form relationship between the presence of merger activity and changes in the
average RN wage in each MSA indicates that merger activity is also associated with lower
rates of wage growth for nurses. These results are consistent with prior research indicating
that merger-driven consolidation depresses local labor market-level wage growth. The con-
tribution of this chapter is to measure concentration, mergers, and labor market data for a
specific profession in the United States.
The empirical results of both chapters are consistent with employers’ exercising some
degree of wage-setting power in labor markets.
iTo my parents,
the two finest teachers I have had.
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1Chapter 1
The Labor Market Impacts of
Employer Consolidation: Evidence
from Germany
1.1 Introduction
A growing body of research shows that workers’ labor market outcomes are driven in part
by employer-specific factors. Workers who lose a job typically experience persistent wage
declines (e.g., Davis and von Wachter, 2012), while the earnings of those who remain at a
given firm vary with the fortunes of their employer (see the recent review by Card, Cardoso,
Heining and Kline, 2018). Moreover, there is increasing evidence that the decisions of just
a few potential employers can substantially affect wages in a local labor market (Azar,
Marinescu, Steinbaum and Taska, 2018). These patterns have led to renewed interest in
the connections between product market concentration, labor market concentration, and
aggregate wage and employment outcomes.
This paper contributes to the understanding of firm-specific pay premia and changes in
concentration on workers by studying how specific expansions of the boundaries of firms —
acquisitions — affect labor markets. We use matched employer-employee earnings records
from West Germany to identify and study 243 horizontal acquisitions between 1989 and 2008.
Expansions to the boundaries of firms provide a unique testing ground for understanding
whether firms play a causal role in the determination of workers’ outcomes. Because horizon-
tal acquisitions serve to increase product market and labor market concentration, estimating
their causal effect on workers’ earnings sheds new light on how changes in industrial concen-
tration impact specific workers instead of aggregates.
We identify acquisitions using a clustered worker outflow methodology based on methods
used to identify firm births in administrative data.1 Specifically, we focus on a set of acquisi-
tions of a given plant by a buyer that operates a similar plant (in the same 5-digit industry)
1See e.g. Benedetto, Haltiwanger, Lane and McKinney (2007); Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013).
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in the same local labor market. The acquisitions in this study are associated with gradual
declines in employment at the consolidating establishments, which shrink by an average of
27% in the five years following an acquisition.
We hypothesize that such horizontal acquisitions exert three countervailing forces on
workers. First, because employment declines, some workers are displaced. Second, for work-
ers who remain, rents per worker have arguably increased, leading to upward pressure on
wages. But third, because there are fewer employers competing for workers in the local
market, workers’ bargaining power may have fallen, leading to downward pressure on wages.
To estimate the effect of acquisitions on the earnings and employment of workers whose
employers are acquired (“Targets”) and workers whose employers purchase another (“Buy-
ers”) we use a simple generalized difference in differences framework. Our analysis focuses
on workers with stable employment relationships lasting at least four consecutive years pre-
ceding an acquisition. To identify earnings and employment changes caused by acquisitions,
we use a sample of untreated workers and examine variation in outcomes associated with
variation in treatment within cells derived from interactions of worker covariates. In our
baseline results, we allow for both intensive margin and extensive margin responses to the
acquisition to occur.2 We find evidence that acquisitions reduce the employment earnings of
Target workers by e 552 (t=1.7) five years after the acquisition and do not lead to substantive
changes in the earnings of Buyer workers.
Underlying these muted overall impacts of acquisitions on Target and Buyer workers, we
find two groups of winners and losers. The main losers from acquisitions are women over
48 years of age, especially those employed at Targets in the years preceding an acquisition.
For these individuals, acquisitions cause large (6 ppt.) decreases in private labor force
participation. We see no decline in the labor force participation for men over 48. Our results
are consistent with older women retiring early: the early old-age pension claiming age is lower
for women in Germany (Bo¨rsch-Supan and Wilke, 2004). Winners include Buyer workers
under the age of 40, whose earnings increase by e 379 (t=2.2) five years after an acquisition.
This is an increase of approximately 1% from Buyer workers’ average pre-acquisition earnings
of e 40,806.
To explore whether remaining within the boundary of the Buyer establishment matters
for wage outcomes, we turn to the sample of workers who remain in the labor force in all
years after the acquisition. We divide this sample into two groups: people who are employed
at the Buyer in the fifth year after an acquisition (“retained”) and those who are not (“not
retained”). We observe small differences in pre-determined characteristics between these two
groups. This similarity suggests that selection on observable characteristics for retention is
limited to nonexistent. Partial correlations between subsequent wages and treatment among
workers in this selected sample yield strong evidence that retention within the boundary of an
acquiring firm matters for wage growth. The wage growth of workers who are not retained
by the Buyer is no different than those of control workers who are not retained by their
2In our context, an “exit” from our labor force sample is an exit from private employment to East
Germany, entrepreneurship, or government employment.
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pre-acquisition establishments (in which no identifiable acquisition occurs). In contrast, the
wages of retained workers employed by the Buyer or Target in the years preceding acquisition
rise by e 237 (t=1.4) and e 509 (t=2.2) per year, respectively. In short, the characteristics of
workers retained within the boundary of consolidating establishments do not substantively
differ from those who are not, but their wage growth is much higher. Our interpretation of
this finding is that the boundary of the firm itself, not selection, drives wage outcomes.
Our results are consistent with a simple model of wage determination in which acquisi-
tions cause rents to rise at the consolidating establishment by an amount that exceeds any
erosion of workers’ bargaining power. We posit that increased rents are one channel through
which consolidation affects workers and inter-firm wage differentials emerge.3
To better understand how rents from the acquisition are shared with retained workers,
we split Buyer and Target workers based on their position in the top half or bottom half
of their establishment’s pre-acquisition wage distribution. We find that ex ante lower wage
workers experience the bulk of the wage growth. Lower paid Target workers’ wages rise
2.9% (t=4.1) more than controls with similar ex ante real wages in the five years following
an acquisition while higher paid Target workers’ wage growth does not differ from controls’.
Among Buyer workers, the patterns are similar: wage growth of lower paid workers ex ante
also exceeds that of controls by 2.0% (t=4.6) and higher paid workers ex ante do not fare
differently than controls with similar wages. This set of results is consistent with another
prominent study of firm boundary changes, Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017); firm-specific
profits lead to wage premia paid to a firm’s lower wage workers, which are extended only
within the boundary of the firm.
To conclude, we present preliminary results that examine spillovers from acquisitions
to other workers. This section builds on the observation that workers move up a “job
ladder,” taking jobs of successively higher pay or quality (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). The
average decline in the total number of workers at Buyers in the years following acquisitions
reflects a slowdown in hiring. We document whether the decline in demand for labor at
consolidating establishments affects the wage growth of workers below Buyer establishments
on the job ladder. Simple correlations indicate that larger reductions in Buyer hiring result
in slower average wage growth at establishments that typically send workers to Buyers. This
is consistent with the idea that increases in labor market concentration may break a rung in
some workers’ job ladder, inhibiting their ability to renegotiate with current employers. In
future work, we hope to explore the importance of this mechanism for explaining spillovers
from changes in concentration and other firm-level shocks, such as firm death.
This paper is a contribution to three areas of research within labor economics. The
first is to the longstanding question of how product and labor market concentration affect
workers’ employment and wages.4 Interest in this question has been revitalized in recent years
(Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson and van Reenen, 2017; Barkai, 2017; Azar et al., 2018). Our
3We cannot rule out that retained workers are selected based on an unobserved, time-varying component
of productivity that abruptly changes when the firms consolidates.
4See Section 1.2 for a lengthy discussion of this literature.
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contribution is to evaluate the impact of specific events that affect product and labor market
concentration on a clearly defined group of treated workers relative to a set of counterfactual
workers. Though data limitations prevent us from computing the first stage relationship
between measures of product and labor market concentration and the acquisitions in our
sample, close industrial and geographic proximity of the Buyer and Target establishments
imply that our acquisitions place upward pressure on both. Our results show that costs and
benefits of changes in concentration are not borne equally by all groups of workers. Older
women work less and likely retire early, and only those workers who are retained by Buyers
receive markedly higher wages. Among workers who remain in the labor force, retention by
the target is not strongly related to observed worker characteristics. Taken together, these
results suggest that rents shared with retained workers, not unobserved productivity, drives
the returns to retention.
This paper adds to a nascent literature that documents the consequences of changes to
the boundaries of firms for workers (Weil, 2014). In a seminal contribution, Goldschmidt and
Schmieder (2017) study how specific contractions to the boundaries of German firms affect
the wages of workers left outside of them. Our contribution is to study the consequences of
expanding firm boundaries for workers. We find that remaining within a firm’s borders is
important for wage growth, especially for lower-paid workers, a result that is consistent with
Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017). The importance of remaining within the firm boundary
after the acquisition supports the idea that some of inter-firm wage variation observed in the
U.S. and Europe reflects a causal effect of firms themselves and not simply sorting.
Finally, we contribute to a smaller literature that has sought to understand the impact of
acquisitions on workers. Prior research on this topic has been forced to rely on establishment-
level data (Brown and Medoff, 1988) or has been concerned with firms’ retention decisions
(Margolis, 2006). Our worker-level data and our focus on outcomes that occur in the years
after retention allow us to paint a more complete picture of the impact of acquisitions on
workers than prior work.
1.2 Background
The idea that changes in product or labor market concentration may affect workers has arisen
in several distinct areas of research within labor economics. In this section, we highlight
important components of this prior research and contextualize our contribution.
Interest in the explanations for large and relatively persistent inter-industry wage differ-
entials motivated early empirical studies of the relationship between product market con-
centration and labor market outcomes. This literature hypothesized that product market
concentration created higher rents, which were in turn shared with workers in the form of
higher wages. Typifying this era of research, Weiss (1966) examines the cross-sectional rela-
tionship between concentration and wages using a sample of workers from the 1960 Census.
Weiss’s cross sectional regressions of wages on concentration and controls show that workers
in more concentrated industries earn higher wages, but that this relationship is not robust
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to controlling for workers’ observable characteristics. Weiss interprets the latter finding as
evidence that observed concentration premia do not reflect the sharing of “monopoly” rents.
Weiss’s results also show that wages tend to be higher in concentrated industries in which
there are unions, suggesting that organization of workers is an important determinant of
or response to potential rent-sharing. There are many reasons — several capably outlined
by Weiss himself — to doubt whether the partial correlations estimated in Weiss’s models
identified the structural relationship between rents and wages, but his findings motivated
decades of subsequent research.
Economists revisited the relationship between product market concentration and labor
earnings in the context of the deregulation and labor markets. This literature examined
changes in wages paid to workers employed in industries experiencing deregulation in the
United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s.5 One key contribution of these papers was
to map changes in product market competition to the labor market. In cases such as the
trucking, rail, and airline industries, those changes in competition resulted in changes in the
number of firms operating in the market. On balance, the empirical evidence from this work
supports the idea that average wages in industries such as trucking (Rose, 1987) or railroads
(Davis and Wilson, 2003) fell relative to similarly-skilled workers after instances of deregula-
tion that lead to increases in competition (and, implicitly, decreases in the extent of product
market concentration) among firms in that industry. Taken broadly, these findings support
the idea that a key mechanism by which product market concentration affects labor markets
is the sharing of monopoly rents with workers.6 Because this research used aggregates or
cross-sectional survey data to evaluate worker-level impacts, no definitive study was given
to the disaggregation of these average impacts to workers at different firms that may have
experienced varying changes in the amount of rents they received.
Nearly fifty years after Weiss’s original paper, economists’ attention has returned to the
direct consideration of the relationship between product market concentration and labor
earnings. Autor et al. (2017) and Barkai (2017) document that increases in industrial con-
solidation are related to declines in the labor share of output. Both papers interpret their
results through the lens of neoclassical models of the labor market, but the within-industry
changes that are the empirical basis for these papers are broadly consistent with the results
from both the original and deregulation literatures which informally rely on rent-sharing.
The U.S. takeover boom of the 1980s and 1990s motivated research into whether an
activity typically associated with changes in product market concentration — mergers and
acquisitions — mattered for workers. As in this paper, the establishment-level shocks studied
in this literature serve to increase the concentration of both the product and the labor
market. Brown and Medoff (1988) examine the evolution of wages and employment of
workers in Michigan after acquisitions and find limited evidence of earnings or employment
5(Hendricks, 1994) provides a useful overview.
6A key consideration of this literature was to test the idea that monopoly rents may be shared with union
and non-union workers in the same way (Dickens and Katz, 1987). The prevalence of firm- and sector-level
bargaining in West Germany precludes analysis of within-firm variation in unionization status in this paper.
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losses among workers employed at consolidating establishments.7 As in our paper, this
literature focuses on the outcomes of workers employed at consolidating establishments in
the years following a merger or acquisition. For one subset of acquisitions, Brown and Medoff
find that wages increase and employment declines at establishments in years following an
acquisition. For another subset of acquisitions, they find that wages are flat and employment
rises at consolidating establishments. Margolis (2006) examines the determinants of retention
of workers after mergers and acquisitions in France using matched employer-employee data.
Margolis finds that the probabilities of retention are relatively high for workers who are
involved in a merger relative to a comparison group, and that workers from the “Buyer”
establishment in his context have a higher probability of retention. A main finding from the
acquisitions studied in this literature is that typically immediate employment losses due to
acquisitions are not large.8 Our work echoes these findings, although we caution that the
types of acquisitions considered in this literature may not be representative of all mergers
and acquisitions. Findings pertaining to wages are mixed.
A likely consequence of a more concentrated product market is that some workers may
face a more concentrated labor market. For this reason, economists interested in imperfect
competition in labor markets have considered how changes in product market concentration
have affected workers. Simple market-level models of Cournot oligopsony imply that the
market-level rate of exploitation is the product of the inverse labor supply elasticity and a
Herfindahl index of employment concentration (Boal and Ransom, 1997). While an inability
to observe variation in labor demand across markets precludes a convincing empirical assess-
ment of such claims, the insight that a market with fewer employers may be one in which
those employers have more wage-setting power is intuitive. Recently, Azar et al. (2018) ex-
amine how changes in one measure of labor market concentration may affect workers. They
find that increases in the concentration of postings within local labor markets are negatively
correlated with posted wages, and interpret this result as evidence of wage-setting power of
employers.
This paper considers acquisitions among establishments that are extremely close in prod-
uct market and geographic space. Data limitations prevent us from estimating the first stage
relationships between product market concentration and our events and labor market con-
centration and our events, but the specific context the acquisitions we consider implies that
both should be positive. Although we do not directly observe product market concentration,
if the sales of the establishments in the same municipality and industry cell overlap, then
the acquisitions we observe in our sample will increase product market concentration, hold-
ing demand and other producers’ output fixed. Although we do not directly observe labor
7Use of establishment-level data in Brown and Medoff (1988) constrains them from examining worker-
level outcomes, as we do in this paper. The ability to examine workers directly lets us isolate a group of
workers exposed to the acquisition ex ante and to avoid conflating changes in establishment-level pay with
changes in the composition of establishments’ workforce. It also lets us examine how outcomes vary by
retention status.
8In a paper that studies specific acquisitions by private equity firms in the U.S., Davis, Haltiwanger,
Handley, Jarmin, Lerner and MIranda (2012) observe similarly small net employment losses.
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market concentration, the close proximity of Buyers and Targets implies that the events in
our sample serve to reduce workers in their local labor market face a decrease in the number
of employers they face.9
1.3 Conceptual Framework
Most of the issues surrounding the effects of firm consolidations on workers can be captured
in a very simple model of wage determination that includes a component attributable to
“rents” at a worker’s current employer. A standard version of such a model has the form:
wi = ai + λiRj(i) + ei. (1.1)
In Equation 1.1 wi is the wage earned by worker i in some period and ai is a benchmark
“alternative wage” that a worker could earn, for example, in a competitive sector, Rj is
some measure of rents (or quasi-rents) at employer j, j(i) is an index function giving the
identity of i’s employer in the period, and ei is a term capturing all other factors, and λi
is a factor representing “bargaining power” of worker i. Such a model is often specified in
standard search and matching models (e.g. Pissarides, 2000), and it can also be derived in
monopsonistic wage setting models (e.g. Card et al., 2018). In the latter case, the bargaining
power term λi is related to the inverse elasticity of labor supply for workers in the same
occupation or group as individual i. Equation 1.1 is also closely related to earlier bargaining
models (de Me´nil, 1971; Svejnar, 1982), and is widely used in the rent-sharing literature (e.g.
Card, Devicienti and Maida, 2014). A special case of Equation 1.1 is a perfectly competitive
labor market, which occurs if λi = 0.
Assume that a model like (1.1) describes the wages of two groups of workers:
1. Workers at an establishment that is currently owned by one company and will be ac-
quired by another company that operates a nearby establishment in the same industry.
Call this group “Target” workers.
2. Workers employed in the establishment owned by the acquiring firm. Call these workers
“Buyer” workers.
Prior to the acquisition, Buyer and Target workers’ wages may vary due to differences in
workers’ skills or qualifications (ai), differences in the rents at the Buyer and Target estab-
lishments Rj(i), and differences in the degree of rent-sharing λi across the two establishments.
The implications of an acquisition for each group of workers depend upon changes in ai,
λi, and Rj(i). Several factors affect these responses, and we examine the changes that we
9Although we observe all workers employed in West Germany, the rules for establishment identifier
assignment prevent us from constructing indices of concentration that are comparable across markets. Work
measuring changes in labor market concentration within local labor markets in this paper is ongoing.
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expect based on the context of this paper, horizontal acquisitions in narrow geographic areas
in Germany. We first consider the wage responses of workers who remain employed at the
consolidating establishment. We consider separations second.
For Buyer and Target workers who remain employed by the consolidated establishment,
rents per worker will be the same. The equalization results in an immediate increase in the
wages of workers originating from the establishment with lower rents.10 Given our context,
we find it reasonable to assume that the horizontal acquisitions enhance the product market
power of the establishments involved. This product market power increases the amount of
rents per worker at the consolidated establishment.11 This places upward pressure on wages
of all retained workers, regardless of their origin establishment. The timing of this change
depends upon the duration of timing required to reap increased profits.
Models of bargaining in input markets show that the change in workers’ bargaining power
after consolidation of employers depends upon the degree of substitutability of those employ-
ers’ products (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988). Because the context of our empirical exercise is
consolidation within the narrowest industry codes in Germany, we assume that the Buyer
and Target produce substitutes. In this case, consolidation decreases workers’ bargaining
power and λi falls, placing downward pressure on wages. Intuitively, this happens threats
to work for competing firms if higher wage demands are unmet become less credible when
there is one fewer competing firm.
For simplicity, we assume that workers’ alternatives ai are unchanged by acquisitions.
This may be true for many reasons, including workers are mobile or if the establishments
involved are relatively small relative to the labor market. Taken together, these effects imply
that the net change in wages reflect whether the declines in bargaining power or increases
in rents dominate.
A worker will separate when the wage they are offered by the consolidating establishment
is lower than some outside option. We do not formally model it, but we consider the outside
option to be a function of a worker’s alternative wage ai and other factors, such as luck and
a pre-determined arrival rate. Our model suggests that separations will occur among three
groups of workers. The first is workers at establishments with ex ante lower rents, where
a given uniform reduction in bargaining power will push more workers into separations.
The second is workers who experience larger reductions in bargaining power as a result of
the acquisition. The first two factors are separations driven by reductions in the wage offer
received from the consolidating firm. The third is workers who could have shared in increased
rents at the consolidating establishment but take an even better outside offer. Average wage
trajectories of separating workers can help disentangle which of these impacts dominates.
If separating and retained workers experience average wage growth, this is consistent with
the consolidating establishment offering a share of rents to all workers. If wage growth of
separating workers is modest while retained workers’ wages rise, that implies some workers
do not receive an opportunity to share in rents at the consolidating establishment.
10This change will occur even if ex ante wage levels are similar.
11See e.g. FTC/DOJ Merger Guidelines 2010.
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The destination to which workers separate will reflect the source of their alternative
offer. For younger workers, this alternative offer is more likely to be an employment offer
from another private firm, public sector employment, or entrepreneurship. For older workers,
the alternative offer is likely to be retirement.12
Our simple model implies that rents per worker likely put upward pressure on wages
and a decline in workers’ bargaining power after an acquisition exerts downward pressure on
wages. Among workers who remain at the establishments involved in the acquisition, the net
wage change indicates the dominant effect. Workers who separate are concentrated among
firms with lower rents ex ante and groups of workers with larger reductions in bargaining
power; the destination after separation reflects the source of the alternative wage offer. The
similarity of retained and separating workers’ wage growth reflects the extent to which all
workers may share in product market rents.
1.4 Data, Terminology, and Identifying Acquisitions
In this section, we describe our data, we construct a taxonomy of the entities that employ
workers and discuss whether we observe them in our data,and we explain our worker-flow
based methodology for identifying acquisitions.
1.4.1 Data
We use a dataset of matched worker-establishment earnings histories that covers all private
employment spells qualifying for social security taxes in Germany.13 The data are main-
tained by the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB), they are commonly known
as the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB), and they have been used extensively in
empirical economic research. The IEB data present two main advantages for our objective
of identifying the impact of acquisitions throughout the labor market. First, they contain an
identifier designating an employer associated with each employment spell. We combine the
establishment identifiers with knowledge of the rules for establishment identifier assignment
and mass outflows of workers across identifiers to pinpoint acquisitions of one workplace by
another (see Section 1.4.3). Second, our ability to observe the earnings histories of specific
workers affected by workplace consolidation allows us to observe the earnings and employ-
ment of workers over time regardless of their private employer. This lets us assess the impact
of an acquisition on workers who separate.
To summarize workers’ activities during a year, our analysis uses an person-by-year
dataset that contains information about each worker’s employer on June 30 of each year.14
12Collective bargaining, another factor that we do not directly observe, also plays a role in the determi-
nation of subsequent employment.
13Approximately 80% of all spells in Germany qualify for social security (Card, Heining and Kline, 2013).
14Using June 30 or July 1 as a reference date is consistent with other research that converts the IEB spell
data into a person-by-year panel (Ja¨ger, 2016).
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We record each worker’s total annual earnings and average daily wage across all employment
spells and for those associated with the June 30th employer. We also include information on
total annual unemployment benefit receipt, and we exclude workers with more than three
years between employment or unemployment benefit receipt spells from our sample.
1.4.2 Terminology
Matched employer-employee earnings datasets such as ours are often derived from govern-
ment records collected for the purposes of taxation or social benefit distribution. Researchers
typically refer to the entities associated with various employer identifiers in such datasets as
“firms,” even though the relationship between such identifiers and the entities that organize
production may vary across datasets. To facilitate accurate comparisons of our findings to
other contexts, we describe our taxonomy of the entities that employ workers in our data.
A workplace is a single physical location dedicated to the production of a good or
services. An establishment is one or more workplaces allocated a single establishment
identifier (Betriebsnummer) by the German Employment Agency (BA). A company is a
legal entity that owns one or more workplace. In our dataset, we directly observe establish-
ments only, but in certain contexts we can infer that establishments are owned by distinct
companies.15 We describe this process, which is crucial for our ability to identify acquisitions,
in the following section.
1.4.3 Identifying Acquisitions Using IEB Records
Our objective is to identify acquisitions, which we define as instances where a “Buyer” es-
tablishment owned by one company takes control of a large share of the factors of production
of a “Target” establishment owned by a different company. An accurate methodology for
identifying acquisitions using employer-employee earnings records must identify (1) distinct
companies and (2) a change in the ownership of factors between distinct companies. To iden-
tify distinct companies, we use the German Employment Authority’s rules for assignment of
establishment identifiers. It is these rules that govern the assignment and maintenance of the
identifiers used for the purposes of selecting social security taxes and it is these identifiers
which we observe for every employment spell in our data. To identify a change in control
of the establishment’s productive resources, we examine instances in which large share (over
50%) of an establishment’s workers appears at an establishment owned by a different com-
pany in the year after that establishment dies. Using the IEB data allows us to identify
acquisitions only within narrow geographic and industry cells. We identify 243 acquisitions
occurring within narrow industries and within close spatial proximity with our approach. To
identify changes in the ownership of factors of production, we use clustered outflows of one
factor, workers, combined with the death of the establishment originating the outflow. The
remainder of this section describes the specific details of our methodology.
15Distinct establishments within the same municipality and detailed industry are distinct companies. See
Section 1.4.3.
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We distinguish distinct companies in the following way. Earnings records in the IEB are
allocated an establishment identifier, also known as a Betriebsnummer. The Betriebsnum-
mer, which provides the basis for the distinct employers identified in research papers such
as Ja¨ger (2016), is the administrative identifier used by the German social security system.
We first describe how the German Employment Agency (BA) assigns establishment iden-
tifiers to new workplaces. Workers who are employed at a new workplace owned by a company
that does not already own a different workplace within the same municipality and narrowly-
defined (5-digit) industry are assigned to a new establishment identifier (Han, 2007).16 If
the company has already been assigned an establishment identifier that falls within the same
municipality-by-industry cell, individuals at the new workplace are allocated that company’s
existing establishment identifier. In the latter case, no new establishment identifier is as-
signed despite the different physical locations of production.
When a workplace or establishment changes ownership, the BA assigns a new estab-
lishment identifier to the workers who have experienced the ownership change. The BA
follows the rules governing the allocation of new establishment identifiers in these cases.
Thus, if the company that acquired the target establishment owns other establishments in
the same municipality and industry, the acquired workers are allocated the Target’s estab-
lishment identifier in the following period. Otherwise, those workers receive a completely
new establishment identifier.
These rules imply the following three-step process to identify the transfer of workers
across distinct companies.
1. Using our worker-by-year dataset, identify a subset of mass clustered outflows from
one establishment to another where the “sending” establishment dies in the year of
the outflow. To be considered a mass outflow, over 50% of the workers employed at an
establishment in year t must be employed together elsewhere in year t+1. We adapt
these thresholds from work that uses mass clustered worker outflows to identify firm
births (Benedetto et al., 2007; Hethey-Maier and Schmieder, 2013).
2. We identify the subset of mass outflows in which the establishment that receives the
outflow existed in parallel with the originating establishment within the same detailed
industry and municipality in the four years preceding the outflow. This condition
ensures that the flow of workers occurs across distinct company lines.
3. We condition on the size of the both the sending and receiving establishments exceeding
20 workers two years before the year of the outflow. We do this to ensure that the
transaction is real. We eliminate establishments with 10,000 workers or more to prevent
a single transaction from dominating the results of our worker-level analysis.
16Industry codes have changed over time in Germany and were only available at the three-digit level
before (Eberle, Jacobebbinghaus, Ludstek and Witter, 2014). Our understanding is that the most detailed
contemporaneous industry code available has been used for betriebsnummer assignment. Thus we use 3-digit
industry codes before 2000 and the appropriate contemporaneous 5-digit code afterward.
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Because both establishments had different identifiers but were within the same industry
and municipality in the years before the acquisition, we infer from the rules for establishment
identifier assignment that the workers at those two establishments were employed by different
companies. If all criteria are satisfied, the establishment that dies and sends the outflow is
considered to be the Target and the establishment that receives the outflow is the Buyer. The
clustered outflow of workers from the target establishment and the target establishment’s
death imply that it was an acquisition.
We limit our analysis to acquisitions to establishments in the Finance and Insurance,
Manufacturing, Wholesale and Retail Trade, and Service sectors in which both the target
and the acquired establishments exceed 20 workers in size two years before the acquisition.
We impose establishment size restrictions because mass clustered outflows from very small
firms is unlikely to reflect changes in ownership. We select the four groups of industries
as they comprise the vast majority of the acquisitions that we identify in our sample. For
establishments that appear as Targets in different years, we select the acquisition that occurs
first.
Our methodology detects several types of acquisition. It detects subsets of a national
acquisition between multi-establishment Targets and Buyers where the Target and Buyer
have workplaces in the same municipality and industry. It detects instances in a large, multi-
establishment company combined with a single-establishment company that operates within
the same municipality and industry cell. It detects consolidation of two single-establishment
companies. And it detects partial acquisitions in circumstances when a Buyer acquires at
least one establishment from a Target. A shortcoming to our analysis is that we cannot
distinguish between the cases listed above.
The acquisitions in our sample may occur for a wide variety of reasons, including the
ability to more productively utilize a Target’s factors, a desire to exert pricing power in the
product market, or to acquire the intellectual property. Some prior research has attempted
to categorize acquisitions based on the reasons they occurred (Brown and Medoff, 1988). We
do not have information that allows us to confidently categorize the reason for acquisitions,
and so we leave analysis of motivations researchers with data better equipped to explore this
topic.17
1.5 Characteristics of Targets and Buyers
The methodology outlined in Section 1.4.3 allows us to identify a specific set of acquisitions.
In this section, we describe the evolution of employment and average wages at Buyers and
Targets.
Table 1.1 reports the average characteristics of the 243 transactions that we identify
between 1989 and 2015 in the year before the transaction occurs. Columns 1 and 2 of Table
17We have examined variation in establishment-level outcomes among buyers and suppliers with differing
wage and employment growth profiles in the pre-acquisition period and found no substantive differences in
establishment-level employment in wages across permutations.
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1.1 compare the average characteristics of the target and buyer establishments in our sample.
As one would expect of similar establishments located within a local labor market, buyers
and targets are quite similar along many observable dimensions, including average wages,
share of female workers, skill groups, and occupation shares. Buyers and Targets differ with
respect to their size: the average Buyer size is 2.96 times the size of the average Target in the
year preceding the acquisition. The number of Target establishments exceeding the number
of Buyer establishments reflects the fact that there are several multi-Target transactions in
our sample. In the remainder of this paper, we analyze multi- and single-Target transactions
together. In cases where Buyers undertake multiple transactions, we analyze the first.
Panel A and Panel B of Figure 1.1 depict the average size of Targets and Buyers over
event time in terms of total number of workers (Panel A) and log number of workers (Panel
B). Logs and levels are presented as total establishment size exhibits some dispersion. Buyer
establishments remain roughly flat in size in the four years preceding an acquisition, falling
an average of .5 workers between the year four years before an acquisition and the year
before an acquisition. Average Target establishment size declines in the years preceding
an acquisition, which fall from an average size of 62 workers to an average of 58 workers
(including both part time and full time employees) between four years and one year before
an acquisition.
Event time 0 in Figure 1.1 is the year in which the acquisition occurs. Panels A and B
show that in the year of the transaction, the average Target increases in size by 58.2 workers,
approximately the average size of a Target establishment. This change in size reflects all
workers employed at the establishment, not solely individuals who are acquired from Target
establishments. The magnitude of the overall increase in event year Buyer size foreshadows
a finding that we will explore in detail in Section 1.6: on average, there are not large layoffs
of Target workers in the year of the acquisition.
The average Buyer establishment declines in size in the years after an acquisition. The
evolution of the size of the Buyer establishments over time is shown between event time 0
and event time 5. The average size of Buyer establishments falls by 19.1 workers in the post-
event period. The average decline is attenuated slightly by growth among larger Buyers; the
average size of Buyers falls 27 log points (or approximately 27%) according to Panel B. The
decline in average size does not reflect the exit of Buyer establishments; in our sample we
condition on the survival of Target establishments from event time 0 until event time 5.
Panel C of Figure 1.1 depicts the average real log daily wage paid by buyer and target
establishments over event time.18 Compensation at average Buyer and Target establishments
is nearly identical in the years preceding an acquisition. The trajectories of average wages
at Buyers and Targets are quite similar in the years preceding the acquisition, with wage
growth and levels at the average Buyer establishment slightly exceeding that of the average
Target. Four years before the acquisition, the gap in average daily wages at Buyer and Target
establishments is .4%, favoring Buyer establishments. In the year before the acquisition,
this gap rises to 1.3 percent. Panel B of Figure 1.1 depicts the average annual employment
18The phrase “event time” refers to the years preceding and succeeding an acquisition.
CHAPTER 1. WORKPLACE CONSOLIDATION IN WEST GERMANY 14
earnings of target and buyer workers.
Increases in wages at Buyers over time are consistent with rents rising at the Buyer
establishment and a degree of rent-sharing with workers. Yet looking at the average Buyer
wage over time does not provide a satisfactory view of the importance of the boundary of
the firm or the impacts of consolidation on workers. It only shows us what happens to
retained workers and misses workers who leave to work elsewhere. Additionally, changes in
the composition of workers at the Buyer over time obscure impacts on workers involved in
the acquisition. For example, if the wages of incumbents rise drastically and offset decreases
in the wages offered to new hires due to a Buyer’s increased labor market power, we will
mistakenly conclude that the consequences of acquisitions are limited.19 The purpose of the
following section is to describe these effects in detail.
1.6 Direct Worker-Level Impacts
The objective of this section is to estimate the effect of an acquisition on the employment
and earnings of workers employed at Target and Buyer establishments in the years preceding
acquisition. We begin by describing the workers whom we define to be directly impacted by
acquisitions and the process of selecting control workers.
1.6.1 Sample Construction
Our sample contains both treated (i.e. Target or Buyer) and control workers with persistent
employment relationships at the establishments in question. We define a set of potential
treated workers as individuals who are employed at a Buyer or a Target establishment on
June 30 of the two years preceding an acquisition. The choice to condition on tenure follows
research on job displacement, which conditions on tenure to isolate workers who have a
substantive employment relationship at a treated establishment.20
To construct counterfactual outcomes for workers involved in an acquisition, we select
ten untreated “control” workers per treated worker at random and use variation in treatment
status and outcomes within covariate combination cells to identify the effect of an acquisition.
We select control workers from a risk set of untreated workers. To appear in the risk set of
potential control workers matched to treatment workers in year t, we condition on the same
criteria necessary for a worker’s inclusion in the treatment sample. Thus, potential controls
for workers treated in an acquisition in year t must be employed at the same establishment
in years t = −1 and t = −2, the size of that employer must exceed 20 workers in t = −1
and t = −3, the establishment must survive until t = 5, and they must be between age 25
19This reliance on establishment-level data is a shortcoming of prior analysis of this topic, e.g. (Brown
and Medoff, 1988).
20We also estimated the worker-level models considered in this section using the set of workers employed
at the two years prior to an acquisition; the quantitative and qualitative conclusions of the direct worker-level
analysis did not change.
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and age 55 in year t. Our final control sample selects ten control workers at random (with
replacement) from the set of potential year t controls for every worker treated in year t.
Treatment and control workers in year t are assigned to a “cohort” ci.
After selection of the control group, we further restrict the sample to include treated
and control workers who are employed at the same establishment in each of the four years
preceding the acquisition (or placebo acquisition) year. The number of controls is not ex-
actly ten times the number of treated observations for this reason.21 We make this tenure
restriction for the sake of comparability of other research on employer-level shocks. All of
the comparisons our regressions undertake are between treatment and control observations
within cohorts because they satisfy the same employment and tenure restrictions in the same
set of calendar years.22 We condition on employment in the four years prior to an acquisition
to better compare the pre-acquisition wage growth between treatment and controls.
Table 1.2 presents means of worker and establishment characteristics for Buyer, Target,
and control workers as of the year before treatment (or in the case of Control workers, the
year of treatment of the cohort to which they are assigned). Consistent with the similarity
of the average characteristics of Target and Buyer establishments describe in Section 1.5,
observable characteristics of Target and Buyer treated workers in the year before treatment
are nearly identical. The average establishment size for Buyer and Target workers in Table
1.2 exceeds that reported in Table 1.1, a mechanical result of using a worker-level dataset.
The average relative size of Buyer and Target workers’ establishments is approximately 1/3,
nearly the exact same ratio as that reported in the establishment-level sample.
The average educational attainment, age, and sex of the control group of workers are
similar to both groups of treatment workers. Average earnings of control workers are roughly
5% lower among control workers compared to both Buyer and Target workers, whose earnings
are very similar. Average establishment size among comparison workers also exceeds that of
the average size of treated workers, a difference that is consistent with the random sampling
of untreated individuals undertaken to construct the control group.
Our identification assumption is that within a cohort the occurrence of an acquisition is
unrelated to those workers’ potential outcomes, conditional on a wide array of interactions
between worker and establishment characteristics. In its conditional independence assump-
tion and the comparison of treatment and control workers within cells of demographic and
establishment characteristic combinations, our approach is similar to propensity score match-
ing (Imbens and Rubin, 2015), a research design utilized by several papers concerned with
the worker-level impacts of establishment-level shocks (e.g. Ja¨ger, 2016; Goldschmidt and
Schmieder, 2017).
Estimating impacts of the acquisition on treated workers relative to controls within covari-
ate groups presents two main advantages over a pairwise matching approach for constructing
worker-level counterfactuals. First, it allows us to utilize a unique advantage of our data
21Results with the 2-year and 4-year tenure restriction are qualitatively similar.
22Use of observations from distinct cohorts to identify a common year effect results in control observations
from one cohort being used to identify year effects in which another cohort has been conditioned to be
employed.
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— that we observe complete earnings histories for all workers in Germany — to construct
counterfactual outcomes. A nearest-neighbor propensity score match, for example, would
force us to select a single control per treatment observation. Selection of a single nearest
neighbor control unit may result in overfitting in the pre-event period, leading differences
between treatment and control to arise from the limited set of control workers’ firm-level
shocks in the post period. By law of large numbers logic, drawing ten controls per treated
unit makes the average control worker’s firm-level earnings innovation more representative
and alleviates concerns of overfitting. Along with alleviating concerns of possible bias from
overfitting in the pre-event period, drawing several controls per treatment improves the pre-
cision of our estimates. This implies that more controls per treatment are preferable. We
choose ten to balance this advantage with computational constraints that arise from large
samples.
The second advantage of variation within demographic by cohort cells is that it allows us
to use standard methods of large sample variance estimation that do not require adjustment
for estimation of the first step propensity score (Abadie and Imbens, 2016). We find our
approach appealing because of its transparency and ease of implementation.
A potential drawback to using an OLS estimator relative to matching methods is that
is not robust to substantial differences in covariates between treatment and control units
(Imbens, 2014). We find that the means of the distributions of covariates are similar across
Target, Buyer, and Control units. We interpret this similarity as evidence that our choice of
OLS is likely to yield similar estimates to conventional matching estimators.23
1.6.2 Unadjusted Differences Between Treatment and Control
Figure 1.2 depicts the evolution of employment earnings, employment, employment at the
consolidated entity, and annual UI benefit receipt among workers in the Target, Buyer,
and Comparison groups in the four years before the acquisition through five years after
the acquisition. The figure plots means and standard errors of relevant variables without
adjusting for any differences in other covariates. The purpose of these figures is to illustrate
the nature of the underlying data.
Figure 1.2 Panel A depicts the average total earnings (in 2010 e) among Buyer, Target,
and Comparison workers over event time. This figure includes both intensive and extensive
margin responses of earnings; individuals who do not appear in the sample as employed or
receiving unemployment insurance benefit income on June 30 of a particular year are as-
signed a value of e0.24 This figure depicts an average decline in total earnings for control
workers from an average of e 37,716 in the year before the acquisition to e 32,588 in the fifth
23A direct comparison of the results recorded here with those obtained from use of a matching estimator
will be available in a future version of this paper.
24We choose June 30 so that our counts of workers correspond to an establishment roster dataset collected
by the IAB (the BHP) whose data reflects establishment composition as of June 30 of each year. The decision
to focus on individuals’ activities as of June 30 of each year is common in research that uses the IAB worker
histories (Ja¨ger, 2016; Schmieder, von Wachter and Heining, 2018).
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year after the acquisition, an average decline of 13.5%. In nominal and in percentage terms,
average earnings losses were more severe for both types of treated workers. Target work-
ers’ average earnings fell from e 40,632 to e 34,503 (-15.1%) while Buyer workers’ average
earnings dropped from e 40,806 to e 35,419 (-13.2%) over the same time period.
Panel B shows that five years after the acquisition, employment losses are more severe for
Target workers (-20.5%) than both Buyers (-18.5%) and Controls (-17.5%). Panel C depicts
the average log daily wage among workers who remain employed and indicates that rates of
average wage growth among workers who remain employed are higher for workers in Buyer
(5.8%) and Target (5.3%) establishments than controls (4.0%). This suggests that it will be
important to consider workers who remain in the labor force separately.
Panel D depicts that rates of employment at the “consolidated establishment” are lower
for Target and Buyer workers than controls. For Target and Buyer workers, we define
the consolidating entity a worker’s t = −1 establishment in the pre-event period and the
Buyer in the post-event period. For Controls, the consolidating entity is a worker’s t = −1
establishment in all years. Average annual amounts of unemployment insurance benefit
receipt (Panel D) rises in the years following the sample.
Taken together, the average trajectories of treated workers relative to controls suggest
that acquisitions create two sets of winners and losers. Workers at Target and Buyer es-
tablishments are more likely than controls to leave private employment in West Germany
and both groups receive more average annual unemployment insurance benefits. Those who
remain employed, however, experience higher rates of wage growth than controls.
1.6.3 Worker-level Regression Estimates
To quantify the effect of the acquisition on the outcomes of Buyer and Target workers, we
estimate a standard event study regression model that identifies the effect of each treat-
ment based on variation in treatment status within cohort by year by covariate group cells.
Specifically, we estimate the following regression:
yit = αi + δt,c(i),X(i) + ξj(i)t +
5∑
k=−4
T kitβ
k +
5∑
k=−4
Bkitγ
k + it. (1.2)
In Equation 1.2, yit denotes worker i’s year t outcome. αi are person fixed effects, and
δt,c(i),X(i) are cohort by year by covariate group fixed effects.
25. In our preferred specification,
X(i) is an indicator variable for the interaction of person i’s gender, skill group,26 within
cohort wage decile (measured in t=-1), and t = −4 to t = −1 establishment average wage
growth. We discuss the selection of these covariates in the following section. j(i) is the
25For control individuals characteristics are assigned on the basis of an individual’s characteristics in the
year preceding the cohort to which they are assigned. See Section 1.6.4 for details.
26We use three skill groups based on an individual’s education or vocational training: college educated,
not college educated but with vocational training, and less than vocational training/other.
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geographic district in which the workers is employed in year preceding the event t = −1.
ξj(i)t is a geographic district (kreis) by year effect that is common across cohorts.
27 T kit and
Bkit are indicator variables denoting a worker’s employment at a target or buyer k years from
the year of an acquisition.
Estimates of the coefficients of interest in equation 1.2 summarize average differences
between treatment and control workers of each type in each year from four years before
to five years after the acquisition. Under our identification assumption that a worker’s
assignment to an acquisition is unrelated to their potential outcomes conditional on X(i),
βk and γk identify the effect of the acquisition of treated workers k years from the treatment.
We estimate the regression on the balanced panel of 3,835,040 observations, comprised of
383,504 workers and 10 observations per worker. In all specifications, we compute standard
errors clustering by pre-event year establishment.
1.6.4 Covariate Selection
In Equation 1.2 X(i) is the indicator variable that denotes worker i’s combination of co-
variates. As is typically the case when conducting empirical research, we face a trade off
between the internal consistency and external validity of our regression model (DiNardo and
Lee, 2011). Adding more interactions to the set of characteristics that comprise the cells of
X(i) makes conditional independence more plausible while narrowing the generalizability of
the parameter we estimate, which is the average treatment effect conditional on the set of
covariates specified.
A typical benchmark for assessing the suitability of a control group to serve as a counter-
factual for treated units in a generalized difference in differences framework is the evaluation
of “pre-trends.” In this context, we evaluate whether this assumption is satisfied for dif-
fering sets of potential covariates to be included in this paper’s baseline regression model.
To illustrate the covariate choices that we make and how they affect one’s interpretation of
the pre-trends in the event study specification, we conduct an analysis that summarizes the
pre-trends conditional on our choice of covariates.
Table 1.3 presents the set of potential covariates that we consider. The number recorded
next to each covariate represents a regression model that includes that covariate and all
lower numbered covariates in the set of discrete covariates used to construct Xi. Each
number represents a regression model that includes interactions of the covariate next to the
number along with all lower-numbered covariates with cohort by year effects.
The y-axis of Figure 1.3 plots the slope of a four-observation regression of the coefficients
β−4, β−3, β−2, and β−1 on event time for the corresponding event years. The x-axis denotes
a particular regression model used to generate the estimates of
{
βk, γk
}k=−1
k=−4. The covariates
used in each model are listed in the bottom panel of Table 1.3.
27Kreis, or “districts,” are areas that are larger than municipalities but which tend to me smaller than
local labor markets (Kropp and Schwengler, 2017).
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Our preferred set of covariates is Model 5, as it minimizes the total pre-event trend slope.
The addition of establishment size quartiles does not markedly change the magnitude of the
pre-event estimated slope coefficient, while further limiting the set of comparisons to be
conducted among controls.28 Qualitatively and quantitatively, estimates from Models 4 and
6 are highly similar to those from Model 5.
1.7 Results
This section presents estimates of Equation 1.2, beginning with the full sample of workers in
Section 1.7.1. We find that acquisitions cause modest earnings declines for Target workers
and have no discernable effects on the outcomes of workers who were employed at Buyer
establishments before the acquisition. In Section 1.7.2 we examine how acquisitions affect
different demographic groups of workers. This analysis reveals substantial heterogeneity in
acquisitions’ impacts across demographic groups: acquisitions appear to cause women over
48 to retire early while there is evidence that younger men employed at Buyers earn more
on average despite some employment losses.
1.7.1 Full Sample: All Workers
Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimates of βk and γk from Equation 1.2
using annual employment earnings, employment, employment at the “consolidating entity,”
and annual UI benefit receipt as dependent variables. A clear pattern of reductions in
the extensive margin of employment, especially among workers at Target establishments,
dominate our full-sample results.29
Figure 1.4 Panel A depicts the coefficient estimates from models in which the dependent
variable is workers’ total employment earnings. In this model, zeroes are assigned to workers
who disappear from the sample, meaning that they either drop out of the labor force, leave
West Germany, or work in Germany’s public sector. Although many of the estimated Target
worker impacts are not statistically significant at conventional levels, the temporal pattern
of the coefficient estimates indicates that Target workers experience both an immediate loss
in earnings which gradually increases in severity over time. Five years after the acquisition
occurs, estimates show that workers employed at Target establishments in the years preceding
acquisition experience reductions in employment earnings of e 552 (t=-1.7). This is a 1.6%
decline from the target workers’ average earnings in the year before the acquisition.
Figure 1.4 Panel B displays coefficients estimated by the regression in Equation 1.2 with
an indicator for employment as the dependent variable and shows that both immediate
28As the set of treated workers come from several establishments whereas comparison workers come
from many different establishments, making comparisons within establishment size category creates many
covariate cells with low proportions of treated workers.
29Recall that employment sample we use is the set of workers who are employed in West Germany at
private establishments who are not entrepreneurs or in most parts of the public sector.
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and medium-run extensive margin impacts of the acquisition are more severe for Target
workers than Buyer workers.30 Acquisitions cause immediate reductions in employment of
1 percentage point for Target workers. The immediate reductions in employment increase
over time, reaching 2.2 percentage points (t=-3.4) in the fifth year after the acquisition. The
acquisitions do not cause immediate reductions in the employment of Buyer workers. Five
years after the acquisition, however, Buyer workers experience 1.0 ppt (t=-1.92) declines in
employment.
Results from regressions in which the dependent variable is an indicator for employment
at the “consolidating entity” are reported in Panel C.31 Consistent with the patterns of
unadjusted differences in means in Figure 1.2, we observe large immediate declines in the
probability of employment of Target workers in the year of the acquisition (5.2 ppt; t=-
6.8) and five years later (7.8 ppt; t=-5.4). The acquisition also causes an increase in the
probability of a separation from the consolidating entity for Buyer workers, albeit one that
emerges less rapidly than that of Target workers. The probability of remaining at their
pre-event employer falls by 3.3 ppt (t=-2.5) for Buyer workers.
Panel D displays results from models with total unemployment benefit receipt as the
dependent variable. These results mirror the effect of acquisitions on employment losses and
retention: UI receipt rises immediately for Target workers (e 36, t=2.4) and becomes higher
five years after the acquisition. The acquisition causes medium-run (4- and 5-year increases)
in UI receipt among Buyer workers, but no detectable increase in benefits in the short run.
1.7.2 Full Sample: by Age and Gender
Section 1.7.1 suggests that in the sample of all workers that assigns values of zero earnings to
individuals who do not appear in the sample, the first order effect of acquisitions is to decrease
the employment of Target and, to a lesser extent, Buyer workers. This section seeks to
understand whether earnings and employment losses are shared equally across demographic
groups. Though our conceptual framework does not directly address employment, our data
present a unique opportunity to understand whether consolidation disproportionately affects
certain types of workers, a fact that may be useful for understanding how market-level
changes in concentration affect between-group inequality.
We separate the sample into four mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups, which include
both treated and control workers satisfying four demographic criteria: men and women who
are above 40 and men and women who are below 40.32 We summarize the average treatment
effects in the post-acquisition period by pooling event time into pre-event years and post-
event years and estimating a standard difference in differences adaptation of our event study
30Employment is having any employment spell ongoing as of June 30 of a calendar year. See Section 1.4
for details. Coefficients in pre-event years are normalized to zero because of sample restrictions.
31For Target and Buyer workers, we define the consolidating entity a worker’s t = −1 establishment in the
pre-event period and the Buyer in the post-event period. For Controls, the consolidating entity is a worker’s
t = −1 establishment in all years.
32We measure age in the year before the acquisition.
CHAPTER 1. WORKPLACE CONSOLIDATION IN WEST GERMANY 21
regression model from Equation 1.2 separately by demographic group. Specifically, separately
for each group g, we estimate:
yit = αi + δt,c(i),X(i) + ξj(i),t + β
gTi × Postit + γgBi × Postit + eit. (1.3)
In Equation 1.3 αi are person fixed effects, and δt,c(i),X(i) are cohort by year by covariate
group fixed effects; X(i) denotes the indicator for the age group by gender by skill group by
wage group by firm wage growth group assigned on the basis of pre-treatment characteristics
to person i.33 Ti and Bi are indicators for assignment to Target or Buyer treatment status,
and Postit is an indicator variable that equals one if event time is greater than or equal
to zero. Coefficients βg, γg summarize the average within-worker change in outcomes in
regression sample group g in the post-event period relative to the pre-event period caused
by the acquisition for Target and Buyer treated workers, respectively.
Estimates and standard errors (clustered at the t = −1 establishment level) for these
coefficients separately for each demographic group of treatment and control observations are
presented separately for the full sample and separately for each age by gender group in Table
1.4.34
The most striking pattern to emerge from Table 1.4 is the severity of the earnings losses
incurred by both Target (e 1152, t=-3.8) and Buyer (e 648, t=-3.0) women over 40. These
earnings losses are driven by responses in the extensive margin of employment. Within this
group, Target (4.0 ppt, t=5.7) and Buyer (2.1 ppt, t=3.8) employment losses in the post-
acquisition period are the most severe across all four demographic groups for each treatment
type. Sizable effects for women’s over 40 employment benefit receipt income underscore the
idea that this particular group was adversely affected by the acquisitions, relative to controls
within the same demographic group.
Another important finding from Table 1.4 is that acquisitions cause younger Buyer males
to earn e 379 per year (t=2.2) more after an acquisition, even counting workers who exit
employment as having zero earnings. Acquisitions do not have a distinguishable impact on
younger male Target earnings despite causing substantive employment declines (-1.4 ppt,
t=2.3) for that group. These findings suggest that acquisitions cause wage growth among
younger male workers who remain employed. We explore this finding and the role of retention
in depth in Section 1.8.
Beyond modest declines in employment among Buyer women over 40 (-2.2 ppt), acqui-
sitions do not lead to marked declines in the probability of employment among any other
group of Buyer workers. This stands in contrast to Target workers, where each demographic
33For control individuals characteristics are assigned on the basis of an individual’s characteristics in the
year preceding the cohort to which they are assigned. See Section 1.6.4 for details.
34The weighted sum of the demographic coefficients does not exactly equal the full sample coefficient.
This is because we are estimating Equation 1.3 separately for each group (not a fully interacted model) and
so the set of observations that identifies the kreis by year effect changes in each specification.
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group besides men over 40 experiences a statistically significant decline in employment after
an acquisition.35
Comparing the magnitudes of the average impacts on Buyer and Target employment and
earnings reveals that the two impacts are positively correlated for most groups. This fact is
consistent with the suggestive evidence from Section 1.7.1 that extensive margin employment
impacts drive earnings changes, on the whole.
Examination of Column (3) of Table 1.4 Panel B reveals that within each demographic
group, acquisitions cause probabilities of retention at the consolidating entity to be roughly 5
percentage points lower for workers who originated at Target establishments relative to their
effect on workers from Buyer establishments. As in main results, the patterns of average
changes in UI income after acquisitions mirror extensive margin employment responses.
Taken as a whole, the difference in differences regressions discussed in this section show
that there are clear losers from acquisitions: women over 40 from Targets and Buyers are
the main drivers of the average employment losses among treated workers. Employment
losses for these women over 40 are associated with higher rates of sample exit caused by the
acquisition. Men over 40 at Targets and Buyers do not suffer employment losses or earnings
changes that are statistically distinguishable from zero.
We cannot directly observe the reason why workers are no longer employed in our sample.
However, the pattern of results that emerges in this paper is consistent with women over
40 claiming retirement benefits. In major pension legislation passed in 1972, the German
government set the minimum age for old-age pension claims to 60 for women and 65 for men
(Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1999). Pension reforms passed in 1999 raised the retirement
age for women gradually to 65 by 2010. Thus, for our entire sample, the female retirement
age is earlier than the male retirement age. For half of the years our sample covers, the female
retirement age is five years less than that of males, a substantive difference (Bo¨rsch-Supan
and Wilke, 2004).
In practice, the age at which German workers retire is often less than the eligibility age.
Bo¨rsch-Supan and Wilke (2004) calculates that 20% of men and 25% of women stop working
before the minimum pension eligibility age and notes that the process of “onboarding” to
public pensions typically begins with the uptake of unemployment benefits in years before
pension eligibility. In work for a separate project that uses a 2% sample of West German
worker histories, we observe similar patterns of spikes in unemployment benefit income for
older workers across genders in the years preceding a permanent exit from private employ-
ment.36
To provide circumstantial evidence as to whether retirement drives the extensive margin
impacts among older women at Targets and Buyers, we fit Equation 1.3 on the set of men
and women between 48-55. We choose to focus this age group because it splits the group of
workers over 40 in half and reveals whether labor force exits occur uniformly among relatively
35However, our sample lacks the power to reject the null hypothesis that the employment reduction in
the post period within each group is identical between Target and Buyer workers.
36These results are available upon request.
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young and relatively old workers within the group. We posit that if exit is concentrated
among women older than 48, this is more consistent with retirement than if both halves of
this age group respond in a similar fashion.
The results, shown in Table 1.5, are consistent with the early retirement among women
driving the employment results in the main sample. Women above 48 experience severe
declines that far exceed those of average results and imply that the entire employment effects
for older women are driven by women over 48. Acquisitions cause employment benefit receipt
to rise dramatically for the oldest women at both Target and Buyer establishments, rising
by an average of e 127.70 (t=3.8) and e 77.4 (t=2.9) per year, respectively. Though we
cannot rule out that this benefit receipt occurs among workers unsuccessfully searching for
re-employment, this pattern is consistent with typical pre-retirement benefit receipt patterns
in Germany (Bo¨rsch-Supan and Wilke, 2004).
In contrast to the women in our sample, acquisitions do not impact the earnings or
employment of male workers who are 48 and over in the year before the acquisition. If
anything there is tentative statistical evidence that the acquisition increases the probability
of employment for 48 and older men at Target establishments slightly (1.1 ppt, t=1.8).
1.8 Understanding Benefits from Acquisitions: Labor
Force Sample
The discussion in Section 1.3 leads us to hypothesize that workers who remain with consol-
idating establishments will experience wage increases if, on average, the increase in rents at
consolidating establishments exceeds reductions in their bargaining power.37 Results from
the full sample of workers in Section 1.7 show that acquisitions cause male workers who
worked Buyer establishments before the acquisitions to make e 379 (t=2.2) more per year.
This result, in conjunction with the Buyer workers’ relatively higher rates of retention (Fig-
ure 1.2), suggests that increases in product market rents may drive wage increases among
retained workers.
To better understand trends in changes in compensation we restrict our sample to individ-
uals who continue to receive some employment earnings in all five years after an acquisition,
a decision that follows sample restrictions typically made in research pertaining to the impact
of layoffs on wages (e.g. Lachowska, Mas and Woodbury, 2018; Schmieder et al., 2018).38
Specifically, our restriction is that to be included in the “Labor Force” sample, an individual
must be either on an employment contract or receiving unemployment benefits as of June
30 of each of the first five calendar years after their acquisition (or, for controls, each of the
five years following the acquisition year for which they satisfied sample eligibility criteria.).
37In the limiting case of competitive labor markets, any changes in wages reflect changes in workers’
outside options. We assume some degree of imperfect competition in this analysis.
38An important outlier in this literature is von Wachter, Song and Manchester (2011), which examines
the importance of the inclusion of workers exiting administrative employment data.
CHAPTER 1. WORKPLACE CONSOLIDATION IN WEST GERMANY 24
Inclusion also requires having employment earnings of at least e 500 in each year. It is im-
portant to note that because we have conditioned on an outcome — employment earnings
the post-acquisition years — the empirical results in this section are partial correlations
that are not estimates of average treatment effects. Despite this limitation, our view is that
the empirical exercise is informative for understanding which workers receive wage increases
after acquisitions.
After conditioning on the set of workers who remain in the labor force in all years after an
acquisition, we divide Buyer, Target, and Control workers into two groups. The first group
is workers who are “Retained” by the Buyer after the acquisition. To select this group, we
identify those workers in the labor force sample whose predominant employer in the fifth
year after the acquisition is the Buyer. Controls are categorized in the retained sample if
they are employed at their t = −1 establishment in the fifth year after their cohort reference
year.39 The second group is workers in the employment sample who are not employed at
the Buyer (or, for controls, reference establishment) in the fifth year after the acquisition
(reference year). The purpose of this distinction is to examine (1) whether the consolidation
confers any wage benefits to Buyer or Target workers who remain in the labor market and
(2) whether such benefits accrue to workers only if they remain at the consolidating entity.
Importantly, because of establishment identifier assignment rules we cannot identify work-
ers who switch establishments but who are still retained by an acquiring company.40 For
example, we will categorize workers who employed at the Buyer establishment’s company
but who are transferred to a workplace in a different municipality or industry as not re-
tained, even though they remain at the same company. This shortcoming should lead us to
understate differences between workers who are retained and not retained.
Table 1.2 displays observable characteristics of workers in each sample and compares
them to workers in the full sample. There are two layers of selection that occur in this table:
from the full sample to the labor force sample and within the labor force sample between
retention and non-retention. Patterns into retention exhibit the same patterns of extensive
margin employment responses reported in Table 1.4. Across Target, Buyer, and Control
workers, retention into the labor force sample occurs for workers who are younger, more
educated workers.
Patterns of retention among control workers in the labor force sample reflect a higher
degree of inter-firm mobility among higher educated workers, men, and younger workers, all
of whom are less likely to be retained. We do not observe differences in ex ante log wages
across retention status for controls, nor are there substantive differences in average wage
outcomes. Taken together, these patterns suggest that leaving a control establishment is
associated with slightly lower earnings conditional on observable characteristics.
The patterns in selection on observables evident in the control group are also present
among Target and Buyer workers. Despite these similarities, average wage growth from t =
39This restriction allows for the possibility that “retained” workers are employed outside of the consoli-
dating entity in at least one year between the acquisition year and t = 5.
40These rules are described in Section 1.4.3.
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−1 to t = 5 among retained workers outpaces that of non-retained workers by approximately
3 ppt. Taken together, the means reported in Table 1.2 indicate that while overall patterns of
retention do not vary much across treatment and Control workers, wage growth conditional
on retention does. This average outcome is consistent with the acquisition causing a change
in rents, with that change being passed on to retained workers. In the following section, we
assess the magnitudes of this impact more formally.
1.8.1 Results for Workers who Separate From Consolidating
Entity
As the means in Table 1.2 suggest, there is little evidence to support the assertion that
acquisitions lead to higher earnings of workers who separate from consolidating entities but
remain employed. Panel A and Panel B of Figure 1.5 display coefficients from estimates
of (1.2) using the sample of Target, Buyer, and Control workers who are in the labor force
but not employed at their consolidating entity in the fifth year after an acquisition occurs.
Neither wages nor annual earnings respond to the acquisition for treated group after controls.
Panels C and D of Figure 1.5 show that in contrast to workers who are not retained in
t = 5, workers who are retained by the buyer experience wage growth. Annual earnings of
retained Target workers increase immediately after the acquisition by e 161 (t=1.4) relative
to controls. Retained Target earnings growth relative to retained controls continues in the
years following the acquisition, reaching e 509 (t=2.2) in the fifth year after the acquisition.
Log daily wages follow a similar qualitative and quantitative pattern relative to the pre-
acquisition mean, rising .006% (t=1.9) immediately and eventually increasing more than
1.2% (t=2.7). Though there are no detectable immediate earnings or wage responses among
Retained Buyers, their earnings growth outpaces that of Controls in subsequent years. By
the fifth year after the acquisition, retained workers’ log daily wages are .006% (t=1.8) higher
than counterfactual, in line with estimated earnings growth of e 237 (t=1.9).
Differential selective retention on time-varying productivity of Buyer and Target workers
relative to retention among controls may drive the earnings and wage impacts we observe in
Figure 1.5. However, there are no substantive differences between either group of treatment
retained workers and retained controls in pre-event periods, a pattern that suggests that the
earnings increases to retained treated workers reflects increased establishment rents shared
with such workers.
1.8.2 Differences by pre-acquisition within-establishment wage
group
Prior work assessing the wage impacts of acquisitions suggests that increased rents may be
shared differentially with different groups of workers (Weiss, 1966). To this end, we examine
how wage impacts vary through the pre-acquisition wage distribution for treated workers by
augmenting our standard event study model with interactions between an indicator for being
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a high-wage ex ante treated worker and the appropriate event study indicator. Specifically,
we estimate the following regression:
yit = αi + δt,c(i),X(i) + ξj(i)t +
5∑
k=−4
T kitβ
k
L +
5∑
k=−4
Bkitγ
k
L +
5∑
k=−4
HiT
k
itβ
k
H +
5∑
k=−4
HiB
k
itγ
k
H + it.
(1.4)
This model differs from Equation 1.2 in one important respect, which is the inclusion
of an interaction term of the event study indicator variables for treatment with Hi, which
is an indicator for whether an individual’s t = −1 wage exceeds the median wage of their
establishment in that year. Estimates of βkL and γ
k
L summarize average deviations of workers
in the bottom half the their establishment’s pre-acquisition wage distribution relative to
controls within the real wage decile and demographic group k years from an acquisition.
Estimates of βkH γ
k
L quantify differential deviations for Target and Buyer workers whose
pre-acquisition wages are or exceed the pre-acquisition establishment median.
Figure 1.6 presents estimates of βkL, γ
k
L, β
k
H , and γ
k
H , from Equation 1.4 in which the
dependent variables are employment earnings and log daily wages. These estimates show
that on average, wage and earnings increases occur among workers in the bottom of the pre-
acquisition wage distribution at Targets and Buyer establishments. According to Panels A
and B of Figure 1.6, lower-wage workers who originated from Target establishments experi-
ence an immediate, statistically significant increase in wages of 1.2% (t=4.4) which gradually
widens to 2.9% five years following an acquisition (Figure 1.6 Panel B). The coefficients on
the high wage interaction term βkH (hollow marker) show that above-median target workers
do not reap any of the wage gains accrued by their lower-paid counterparts. There are no
distinctive pre-trends among these workers, selecting an absence of differential wage growth
of above- and below-median wage Target workers relative to controls within similar covariate
cells.
Post-acquisition trends in the earnings and wages for Buyer workers above- and below-
median wages mirror those of Targets. These are presented in Figure 1.6 Panels C and
D. Pre-trends among these groups suggest that below-median wage Buyer workers are on
a downward wage trajectory in the years preceding the acquisition. This pattern reverse
after the acquisition, as wage gains accrue to this group. Coefficients on the above-median
interaction term show that above-median Buyer workers do not experience differential wage
growth relative to controls in either the pre-acquisition or the post-acquisition period.
Taken as a whole, Figure 1.6 suggests that firm rents may be an important determinant of
outcomes for lower paid workers. This finding is consistent with Goldschmidt and Schmieder
(2017), who find that lower paid workers may lose rents when firm boundaries contract.
These results comes with one important caveat. The IEB employment dataset censors
individuals’ earnings above a social security earnings threshold. In this version of the paper,
we do not impute earnings above this threshold Card et al. (2013); this sample construction
decision is likely to bias or work against finding impacts on the top-half of the pre-acquisition
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wage distribution. However, only 12% of the workers in the years before an acquisition have
wages that hit the social security earnings threshold and are censored and, in results that
are available upon request, we do not observe changes in the share of workers whose wages
are censored after an acquisition. Though our setting is not ideal for detecting wage impacts
on top wage earners, the preponderance of evidence suggests that even accounting for this
limitation, any impacts for above-median wage workers are small.
1.9 Other Impacts of Acquisitions
The previous sections showed that workers employed at establishments that are involved
in acquisitions tend to benefit from the consolidation, if those workers remain employed.
Although they are those for which there is a well-defined research design, these individuals
are far from the only workers who may be impacted by the consolidation. In this section,
we outline two important groups of workers who may be affected by an acquisition.
1.9.1 New Hires
An important component of understanding the extent to which employers may exert market
power in the aftermath of consolidation is analyzing the extent to which wages for new hires
may fall. Taken together, our results on retained workers’ wage growth and muted average
Buyer establishment wage growth suggest that lower wages paid to new hires may balance
out the wage growth observed among retained workers. Such a result is consistent with
e.g. employment protections for remaining workers and firms adjusting on the margin of the
wages the pay to their new hires. Due to data access constraints, our analysis of new hires
will be completed in a subsequent version of this paper.
1.9.2 Spillovers to Wage Growth at Other Establishments:
Preliminary Findings
Many models of imperfect competition in labor markets posit that a key mechanism for
workers’ wage growth is their receipt of outside wage offers. If the reduction in average
Buyer’s post-acquisition size of 27% reflects a decrease in the number of offers sent to workers
or a reduction in the wages offered, acquisitions may be associated with slower wage growth
for workers at establishments beyond those which are directly involved in the consolidation.
Wage growth spillovers are most likely to affect workers at establishments that typically
send workers to Buyers or Targets. Theory and evidence pertaining to job search and mobility
through labor markets indicates that individuals tend to move across firms in way that is
intended to improve their compensation or reduce their unemployment risk (e.g. Jarosch
2018). In light of this observation, reductions in hiring by consolidating establishments are
most likely to inhibit the wage growth of workers below the consolidating establishment on
the job ladder. By “breaking” the rungs of the job ladder, labor market consolidation may
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inhibit the mobility and slow wage growth of workers who would have otherwise received an
offer from the consolidating establishment.
To examine the presence of such spillovers, we must identify establishments below Buyers
and Targets on the job ladder, and we must examine the wage growth and mobility of such
workers. In this analysis, we focus on spillovers among workers at establishments that
typically send workers to Buyers.
We identify workers who are hired by Buyers from a separate establishment in the four
years before the acquisition. Using all employment-to-employment inflows to Buyers in
the four years preceding the acquisition, we identify a distinct “Feeder” establishment that
comprises a large share of hires at each Buyer in the years before the acquisition.41 To qualify
as a Feeder, an establishment must exist from event year -4 to event year 5, it must send at
least 30 workers to a Buyer in four years preceding the acquisition, and the number of hires
must comprise over 15% of all of the Buyer’s hires from employment in the four years before
the acquisition.42
We are able to identify 26 Buyer-Feeder relationships among the Buyers that associated
with acquisitions in our sample. The average characteristics of Buyers for which we identify
Feeders and those Buyers’ evolution before and after the acquisition are quite similar to the
overall overage characteristics displayed in 1.1. The average number of workers hired from
the Feeder by the Buyer falls from 8.7 to 4.0 per year from the pre-acquisition period to the
post-acquisition period. This decline indicates that, at least in the set of acquisitions for
which we can identify Feeders, the average decline in establishment size comes in part from
a reduction in hiring from Feeder establishments.
In the current version of this paper, we observe only the average wage paid to workers
at Feeder establishments and the total reduction in hiring from employment at Buyer estab-
lishments. To examine the extent to which reductions in Target hiring are associated with
changes in average wage growth, we estimate the following regression:
∆ ln y¯j = pi0 + pi1∆Hj + ej. (1.5)
In Equation 1.5, j denotes a Feeder establishment, and ∆y¯j is the difference in the log
average daily wage at the feeder between event time five and event time negative four. ∆Hj
is the total number of workers moving from the Feeder to the Buyer in event years 0 through
5 less the total number of workers moving from the Feeder to the Buyer in event years -4
through -1. pi1 is the correlation between log average wage growth and the total reduction
in hiring. If Buyers comprise a meaningful set of the offers given to Feeder workers and
41In cases in which multiple establishments qualify as Feeders, we consider the establishment that sends
the largest number of workers to the Buyer.
42In light of the establishment identifier assignment rules described in Section 1.4.1, we cannot definitively
conclude that workers at “Feeder” establishments are employed in distinct companies from the Buyer estab-
lishment. Nevertheless, we observe an average wage premium among pre-acquisition employment transitions
from Feeder to Buyer of 8 percent, which we interpret as evidence that a transition across boundaries of a
company has taken place in a typical Feeder-to-Buyer transition.
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reductions in observed hires from Feeders reflect decreases in the volume or attractiveness
of Buyer offers, then we expect pi1 to be greater than zero.
Figure 1.7 illustrates the bivariate relationship between average wage growth and the
change in hires. In Panel A, we plot the average wage change against the change in the total
number of hires (∆Hj); in panel B we normalize the change in the total number of hires
by the Feeder establishment size and find that the strength of the relationship decreases,
indicating that much of the relationship between hiring and average wage changes may be
confounded by differences in establishment size.
The analysis above provides suggestive evidence that reductions in hiring at Buyer estab-
lishments lead to slower wage growth for individuals who remain at Feeder establishments.
In future work, we hope to use the full worker histories of all individuals employed at Feeders
over time to conduct a complete analysis of changes in mobility, wage growth conditional on
mobility, and wage growth condition on retention among workers at Feeder establishments
before and after the acquisition.
1.10 Conclusion
This paper provides direct, worker-level evidence on a question of longstanding interest in
labor economics: how changes in product market and labor market concentration affect
workers. We examine worker-level impacts of events associated with consolidation, acqui-
sitions. The acquisitions that we study benefit some workers and hurt others. Workers
who remain within the boundary of the consolidated establishment experience marked wage
growth relative to control workers who remain within the boundaries of establishments that
do not undergo an acquisition. Workers who remain in the labor force but are outside of the
firm that consolidate do not. In terms of labor earnings, the primary losers from acquisitions
are women over 48, who exit private employment early in a manner consistent with early
retirement. Our findings are consistent with rents increasing at consolidating establishments
or workers’ bargaining power rising. As theory and context suggest that the consolidation
should decrease workers’ bargaining power, we interpret our findings as most consistent with
the former.
We conclude by highlighting two important limitations to this study and their implica-
tions for further research. First, our comparisons workers who are retained by Buyers reflect
partial correlations and cannot be interpreted causally. Though there is little evidence of
selection on observable characteristics, development of a selection correction to address this
limitation would provide a clearer picture of the importance of remaining within firm bound-
aries among consolidating firms.
Second, due to data limitations we cannot directly estimate the relationship between the
acquisitions in our sample and conventional measures of labor and product market concen-
tration. Instead, we must rely on the fact that acquisitions between companies in narrow
horizontal industries and within confined geographic space likely, on their own, serve to in-
crease concentration. Our estimates are best interpreted as a reduced form effect of product
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and labor market consolidation on workers. We view future work utilizing more comprehen-
sive measures of product and labor market concentration as a promising avenue for future
research.
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1.11 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Mean Characteristics of Target and Buyer Establishments in Year Preceding
Transaction, Full Sample
(1) (2)
Target Buyer
Number of workers 58.7 173.7
Log num. workers 3.74 4.75
Daily wage 104.0 105.2
College-educated .10 .10
Male .65 .63
Age 42.13 41.49
N 264 243
Notes: Entries in table are means of Target (Column 1) and Buyer (Column 2) characteristics. Observations
are not weighted by establishment size. Characteristics are measured in the year before the transaction
occurs. Daily wages are measured in 2010 Euros. Targets and Buyer establishments are identified according
to the methodology outlined in Section 1.4.3
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Table 1.4: Difference in Differences Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emp. Earnings Employment Retention UI receipt
Panel A: Full Sample
Full sample
Ti × Postit -386.930 -0.017 -0.064 33.677
(225.283) (0.004) (0.008) (11.796)
Bi × Postit 18.674 -0.002 -0.017 9.390
(140.142) (0.002) (0.008) (10.690)
N 3,835,040 3,835,040 3,835,040 3,835,040
Panel B: Full Sample, By group
Men 40 and Over
Ti × Postit -224.629 -0.004 -0.064 17.512
(276.840) (0.005) (0.014) (22.364)
Bi × Postit 69.743 0.005 -0.010 -7.064
(225.401) (0.004) (0.009) (18.865)
N 1,497,730 1,497,730 1,497,730 1,497,730
Men 39 and Under
Ti × Postit -58.31 -0.014 -0.075 19.89
(338.62) (0.006) (0.016) (11.88)
Bi × Postit 379.22 -0.001 -0.033 5.08
(171.42) (0.003) (0.010) (7.54)
N 1,019,030 1,019,030 1,019,030 1,019,030
Women 40 and Over
Ti × Postit -1152.13 -0.040 -0.071 84.69
(306.95) (0.007) (0.012) (20.76)
Bi × Postit -647.84 -0.021 -0.023 43.44
(211.81) (0.006) (0.008) (16.85)
N 883,030 883,030 883,030 883,030
Women 39 and Under
Ti × Postit -302.04 -0.023 -0.051 16.20
(458.32) (0.010) (0.017) (15.08)
Bi × Postit 92.91 -0.000 -0.001 5.06
(245.43) (0.006) (0.011) (10.09)
N 435,250 435,250 435,250 435,250
Notes: Numeric table entries in labeled rows are difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the acquisition on average
yearly post-acquisition outcomes for pooled sample in Panel A and {βg , γg} for distinct demographic groups g separately in
Panel B (see equation 1.3). Columns denote dependent variable of interest. Ti and Bi are indicators for Target and Buyer
treatment status, respectively. Postit is an indicator denoting whether an observation occurs in a year after an acquisition
(or, for Controls, after the treatment year of their cohort). Standard errors, clustered by pre-event year establishment, are
in parentheses. Minimum and maximum ages for sample inclusion (measured in pre-event year) are 25 and 55, respectively.
Columns denote estimates from models estimated separately for treated and control units in group designated in row header.
CHAPTER 1. WORKPLACE CONSOLIDATION IN WEST GERMANY 35
Table 1.5: Differences in Differences Results: Focus on Older Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emp. Earnings Employment Retention UI receipt
Men 48 and Over
Ti × Postit -237.42 -0.003 -0.059 -31.70
(416.82) (0.008) (0.015) (37.07)
Bi × Postit 303.08 0.012 0.005 -64.04
(344.10) (0.007) (0.010) (30.90)
N 738,030 738,030 738,030 738,030
Women 48 and Over
Ti × Postit -2126.15 -0.067 -0.087 129.70
(476.32) (0.011) (0.013) (34.39)
Ti × Postit -1271.59 -0.041 -0.038 77.40
(337.64) (0.009) (0.010) (27.13)
N 458,850 458,850 458,850 458,850
Notes: Numeric table entries in labeled rows are difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the ac-
quisition on the average yearly post-acquisition outcomes for all workers all workers over 48 separately by
gender. Columns denote dependent variable of interest. Ti and Bi are indicators for Target and Buyer
treatment status, respectively. Postit is an indicator denoting whether an observation occurs in a year after
an acquisition (or, for Controls, after the treatment year of their cohort). Standard errors, clustered by
pre-event year establishment, are in parentheses. The maximum age of sample inclusion is 55.
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Figure 1.1: Mean Characteristics of Target and Buyer Establishments in Years Preceding
and Following Transaction
(a) Panel A: Number of Workers
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(b) Panel B: Log Number of Workers
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(c) Panel C: Average Log Daily Wage
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Notes: Panel A depicts the mean of the total number of part time and full time employees in across all Target
(blue diamond) and Buyer (red circle) establishments as of June 30 of each year preceding and following
the acquisition, which occurs at event time zero. Dotted lines depict 95% confidence intervals constructed
using standard errors of the means. Target establishments do not exist in the year after the acquisition (See
Section 1.4.3). Dashed line at t = 0 denotes the year of the acquisition. Panel B depicts the average log
number of workers. Panel C depicts the average log daily wage (in 2010 Euros) among workers employed at
Buyer and Target establishments. There are 243 Buyer establishments, 264 Target establishments, and 243
transactions underlying these figures.
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Figure 1.2: Average Outcomes of Target, Buyer, and Control Workers Over Event Time
(a) Panel A: Employment Earnings
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(b) Panel B: Probability of Employment
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(c) Panel C: Probability of Employment at Con-
solidated Entity
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(d) Panel D: UI Benefit Receipt
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Notes: Panel presents means over event time for the 9,123 Target, 25,285 Buyer, and 352,763 Control workers
in the sample of directly-impacted workers. Characteristics of workers are reported in Table 1.2. Sample
construction is described in Section 1.6. Dotted lines depict 95% confidence intervals constructed using
standard errors of the means. Dashed line at t = 0 denotes the year of the acquisition. Panel A depicts the
average employment earnings (in 2010 Euros) over event time by group. We assign individuals who do not
appear in the sample e 0. Panel C depicts average retention rate at the consolidated entity over time. The
consolidated entity is the Buyer for all treated in workers in the post-event period, otherwise it is a worker’s
t = −1 establishment. Panel D depicts the average UI annual amount of UI benefits received by workers
across groups and event time.
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Figure 1.3: Baseline Employment Earnings Pre-event Trends Conditional on Different Sets
of Covariates
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Notes: Figure depicts the slope of a bivariate regression line fitted through pre-event eventtime coefficients{
βk, γk
}k=−1
k=−4 separately for each covariate model. Covariates included in each model are described in 1.3.
Red line shows that preferred model is Model 5.
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Figure 1.4: Event Study Coefficients Showing Effect of Acquisition on Target and Buyer
Outcomes
(a) Panel A: Employment Earnings
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(b) Panel B: Probability of Employment
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(c) Panel C: Probability of Employment at Con-
solidated Entity
-.1
-.0
8
-.0
6
-.0
4
-.0
2
0
P(
Em
plo
ye
d 
at
 t=
-1
 e
sta
b.
)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Years relative to acquisition
Target Buyer
(d) Panel D: UI Benefit Receipt
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Notes: Panels present coefficients (points) and 95% confidence intervals (dotted bars) from estimates of
Equation 1.2 using the dependent variable specified in the panel title. Standard errors are clustered by
t = −1 establishment. Estimation sample contains 3,835,040 observations. Coefficients in the pre-acquisition
period in Panel C are omitted as the sample of treated and control workers is restricted to be employed in
these years.
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Figure 1.5: Differences in Earnings and Wages by Retention Status
(a) Panel A: Employment earnings, retained group
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(b) Panel B: Log daily wage, retained group
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(c) Panel C: Employment earnings, not retained
group
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(d) Panel D: Log daily wage, not retained group
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Notes: Figure presents coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimates of Equation 1.2 using the
sample of treated workers who are retained by Buyers in t = 5 and control workers who are retained by
their t = −1 establishment in t = 5. Panels A and B present coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from
estimates of Equation 1.2 using the sample of treated workers who are not retained by Buyers in t = 5 and
untreated workers who are not retained by their t = −1 establishment in t = 5. Standard errors are clustered
by t = −1 establishment.
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Figure 1.6: Trends in Wages and Earnings by Within Establishment Wage Group, Retained
Workers
(a) Panel A: Employment earnings, Buyer workers
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(b) Panel B: Log daily wage, Buyer workers
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(c) Panel C: Employment earnings, Target workers
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(d) Panel D: Log daily wage, Target workers
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Notes: Figure present coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimates of Equation 1.4 using the
sample of treated workers who are retained by Buyers in t = 5 and control workers who are retained by their
t = −1 establishment in t = 5. Panels A and B show estimates where dependent variable is employment
earnings and log daily wage among Buyer workers, respectively. Panels C and D display coefficients for
Target workers. Filled markers denote coefficient estimates for below-median workers; hollow markers denote
coefficient estimates on interaction between event time indicator and an indicator for high wage workers.
Summing coefficients generates average outcome for above-median workers. Standard errors are clustered
by t = −1 establishment.
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Figure 1.7: Changes in Feeder Average Wages and Changes in Buyer Total Hires
(a) Panel A: All hires
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(b) Panel B: Hires relative to size
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Notes: Figures plot the changes in the average log wage at Feeder establishments between t=-4 and t=5
against the total change in hiring that occurs at the Buyer establishment associated with that Feeder between
the pre-acquisition period and the post-acquisition period. Plots represent the regression in Equation 1.5.
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Chapter 2
The Labor Impacts of Hospital
Mergers on Registered Nurses
2.1 Introduction
The first chapter of this dissertation studied how specific instances of consolidation affected
workers at establishments directly involved in those events in the short run. This chapter uses
a wider lens to study how hospital mergers and acquisitions are related to differential changes
in local labor market conditions for registered nurses (RNs)1 over a longer time horizon.
This chapter complements Chapter 1 by restricting attention to a single occupation, by
constructing market-level measures of product (and labor) market concentration, by studying
merger events that are defined through external data sources, and by examining medium run
impacts of those mergers on average wages and employment in different local labor markets.
I begin by presenting some descriptive facts about the labor market conditions that
nurses face. I find that registered nurses typically work in highly concentrated markets and
that nurses who work in more concentrated MSAs tend to have lower wages.2 In 2001,
57% of the 254 MSAs in this study were considered “highly concentrated” by one typical
antitrust standard.3 Workers in those concentrated markets tend to have lower wages: I
estimate a statistically significant cross-sectional elasticity of nurses’ wages with respect to
concentration (as measured using an HHI based on hospital beds under hospital system
control) of -0.08 in 2001. Less concentrated markets tend to be smaller; the 57% of MSAs
considered highly concentrated contain only 25% of all of Registered Nurses employed in
1In this chapter, I will use the terms “nurses,” “registered nurses,” and “RNs” interchangeably. In results
not reported here, I found no substantive impacts of hospital concentration of hospital mergers on the wages
or employment of licensed practical nurses.
2The measure of market concentration I use in this study is a Herfindahl index of product market
concentration based on the number of hospital beds owned by each hospital system. It is highly correlated
with measures of employer concentration and so I use the terms interchangeably throughout the paper.
3This standard, which is discussed in Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum and Taska (2018) is a Herfindahl
Index exceeding 2,500.
CHAPTER 2. HOSPITAL MERGERS 44
2001.
I examine how hospital mergers contribute to differential growth in local labor market-
level measures of concentration, wages, and employment of nurses between 2001 and 2014.
In regressions that weight observations by market population, I find that nurses in markets
affected by at least one merger experienced a rate of growth in market concentration (as
measured by a Herfindahl index of hospital bed ownership) that was 7.9 percentage points
higher (t=1.88) than other markets. I find that the extensive margin of merger activity is
also associated with lower rates of wage growth. Nurses who worked in a labor market that
experienced at least one hospital merger between 2001 and 2014 experienced a rate of wage
growth that was 2.8 percentage points lower (t=1.04) than nurses in markets that did not.
Together, these estimates imply that a 1 ppt increase in a market’s concentration growth rate
is associated with a 0.3 ppt decrease in wage growth over a thirteen year period. Unweighted
estimates of reduced form and first stage coefficients are both statistically significant at the
5% level and quantitatively similar. The unweighted estimates imply a 1 ppt increase in
concentration growth rates corresponds a 0.38 ppt lower rate of wage growth.
Prior research suggests that the impacts of changes in employer concentration are a
function of ex ante levels of market concentration (Azar et al., 2018). To explore this
possibility in the context of the changes hospital concentration, I split the sample of treated
MSAs into two groups, those with above and below median levels of concentration in 2001.
I test for differential impacts of merger activity on concentration and wage growth for these
groups. I find that mergers have a larger impact on concentration growth for MSAs with
relatively low concentration in 2001, but I do not find evidence that wage impacts differ
across the two groups of treated markets.
To illuminate the shorter run adjustments underlying the results from the baseline long
differences analysis, I estimate event study specifications that compare within-market con-
centration, wage, and employment growth for the 39 markets that experienced their first
merger between 2005 and 2008 relative to untreated markets. The results show that markets
experience immediate, statistically significant, increases in concentration of approximately
10% after a merger. There are no statistically significant differences in the patterns of wage
changes in the four years after these merger events relative to untreated markets, though the
pattern of coefficients indicate treated MSAs experience wage losses of approximately 1.25%.
When I compare a subset of mergers that yield especially large (40%) immediate impacts
on concentration to untreated markets, I find that wages are 2.5% lower for treated MSAs
in the fourth year after the merger and I can reject that they are equal to zero. However,
there is evidence of pre-trends in employment among this subsample of treated MSAs.
In the event study and the long differences specifications, I cannot reject the null of no
differential employment growth in markets by merger activity status. However, the point
estimates of the long difference specifications suggest slightly lower rates of employment
growth are associated with merger activity. Measuring nurse “effort” as admissions per
nurse in each market (as in Currie, Farsi and Macleod, 2005), I find that merger activity is
associated with approximately 6 ppt (t=1.73) higher growth in nurse effort. A decomposition
reveals this finding is driven by differential employment growth patterns and not differences
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in changes in admissions.
This paper is the first to examine the contribution of merger activity to differences in the
evolution of labor market conditions faced by registered nurses in the medium run (13 years).
When looking for market-level impacts of employer consolidation, the medium run is the most
appropriate time horizon: an increase in wage-setting power for the largest employers is likely
to take several years to begin to propagate through the market and become detectable. My
findings are consistent with other research that indicates hospitals exert wage-setting power
in the market for registered nurses.
2.2 Prior Research and Contributions
This chapter builds on research in health economics that examines how mergers affect the
determination of prices in negotiations between insurers and hospitals. It also builds on
research in labor economics that considers how wages are set in for Registered Nurses. The
contribution of this chapter is to link these two areas of research by examining how merger-
driven consolidation affects medium run (13-year) changes in hospital market concentration
and nurses’ wages. This chapter also contributes to the literature that examines links between
product market and labor market conditions discussed in detail in the first chapter of this
dissertation.
Research in health economics often focuses on the determination of prices in health
care markets. This research tends to find that the hospitals charge higher prices in more
concentrated markets (Gaynor, Ho and Town, 2015). It also tends to find that mergers and
acquisitions of hospitals by hospital systems (groups of hospitals under common ownership)
increase the prices that hospitals can charge, especially in circumstances where the merger
or acquisition would tend to improve the hospital’s bargaining power in negotiations with
insurers (Dafny, Ho and Lee, 2019). I contribute to this literature by relating the mergers it
studies to the outcomes of workers in labor markets affected by such mergers. This endeavor
illustrates an additional dimension of product market consolidation that is of both academic
and policy interest. Recent research in industrial organization has argued that antitrust
authorities should account for labor market impacts of merger activity (Posner, Weyl and
Naidu, 2018). This paper tests for the existence of labor market impacts of a type of merger
that is often scrutinized by regulators.
The specific human capital required for nursing, availability of wage and employment
data, and relatively high concentration of hospital markets make RNs a good ground to test
for the presence of imperfect competition in a particular labor market (Sullivan, 1989). For
this reason, labor economists typically study nurses in research assessing empirical support
for models of labor market monopsony. Foremost among this line of research is Staiger, Spetz
and Phibbs (2010), which difference in an adjustment to the wage schedule paid to nurses
at Veterans’ Administration hospitals in different markets to estimate a short run elasticity
of labor supply of nurses to hospitals of 0.1, a figure that implies substantial wage-setting
power on the part of hospitals. This paper contributes to the literature looking for imperfect
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competition in the market for RNs by testing whether changes market composition affect
wages, a finding that is best rationalized by an inelastic supply of nurses to hospitals.
More recent work directly estimates the impact of mergers or other changes in the con-
centration of employment on the wages and employment of RNs. The goal of these papers
is similar to this one, although they focus on shorter run (less than 10 year) impacts. Hirsch
and Schumacher (2005) finds that increases in hospital concentration are associated with
slower RN wage growth using a sample of 240 markets over a ten year period; however they
do not consider the role that merger-driven consolidation plays in determining market con-
centration. Currie et al. (2005) finds that wages and employment of RNs do not substantively
change following hospital takeovers in California, but find that nurses’ “effort” (as measured
by the number of patients per nurse) rises after takeovers, indicating a increase in productiv-
ity that is not followed by a commensurate increase in wages. DePasquale (2014) examines
the impact of mergers on the employment and wages of RNs. She finds that mergers have
no short-run wage impacts but cause an immediate decline of 12% among RNs in the year
following an acquisition, on average. As I will discuss later, DePasquale’s results are based
on a measure of merger activity that comes from within AHA annual surveys. Though a con-
venient source of information on mergers, the industrial organization economists who study
the topic of consolidation typically complement and refine this methodology for identifying
mergers using external datasets Cooper, Craig, Gray, Gaynor and van Reenen (2019). For
this reason, I use a dataset of hospital mergers constructed by Cooper et al. (2019), who
supplement AHA ownership change information with private datasets from Irving Levin As-
sociates and external news sources in a format that can be matched to AHA hospital records.
My contribution to this literature is to use this better measure of merger activity and to
study many different markets.
The closest paper to this analysis is Prager and Schmitt (2019).4 The goal of Prager and
Schmitt (2019) is to identify the impacts of mergers on hospital concentration and nurses’
wages. Though the employment data it uses and the parameters it estimates differ from my
approach, the general conclusions of our empirical analyses — that merger-driven increases
in concentration place downward pressure on nurses’ wages — are consistent.5
Prager and Schmitt (2019) estimates difference-in-differences regressions that identify the
average within commuting-zone change in RN wages in the four years following a merger
relative to the four years preceding a merger. Prager and Schmitt (2019) uses a more
robust set of controls than I utilize in this paper, however the exclusion restriction in the
two papers are fundamentally the same. Prager and Schmitt’s treatment group contains
only the 84 markets that experienced a single hospital merger between 2000 and 2010; their
control markets are commuting zones that did not have any merger activity. They do not
detect substantive impacts of hospital mergers on RN wages except for those which have the
largest impact on HHI, for which nurse wages fall by approximately 10% relative to controls
4This paper was first posted in May 2019 while this chapter was already in preparation.
5Prager and Schmitt (2019) use Medicare records to obtain hospital by occupation level wage and em-
ployment data, which they typically aggregate to the Commuting Zone level for the purposes of their analysis.
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over the four years following a merger.
A key difference in our work is that Prager and Schmitt (2019) only find evidence of
impacts of mergers on wages among a subset of approximately 20 markets in which the
first stage relationship between a single merger and concentration is the strongest. This
chapter examines the extensive margin of merger activity across a wider array of markets
and considers the longer run impacts of that activity on concentration growth, wage growth,
and employment growth. My approach in this chapter has the benefit of including more
MSAs, allowing part of the treatment of merger activity to be a “cascade” of subsequent
mergers, and reports estimates for all markets with available data instead of headlining
results for a subset of markets in which the first stage relationship between a merger and
concentration changes is strong.
My findings are that nurse wages grew at slower rates in MSAs where there was at least
one merger relative to those that did not. Among these MSAs, I find that the concentration
impacts of mergers are driven by MSAs with lower ex ante concentration. Rates of wage
growth due to merger activity are similar among MSAs with relatively high and relatively
low ex ante concentration. Despite these distinctions, which I attribute to differences in the
parameters we estimate and the data sources we utilize, the general picture that emerges
is similar: hospital mergers and higher concentration of employment in the hospital sector
likely place downward pressure on Registered Nurses’ wages.
2.3 Data
I assemble data from several different sources. To measure the employment and wages of
registered nurses at the MSA level, I use the annual Occupational and Employment Statistics
(OES) assembled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The outcomes of interest in this study
are the total employment and log average wage of RNs recorded by this file.
To measure the concentration of hospitals, I use information from the American Hospital
Association’s annual survey.6 This survey records characteristics of each hospital and the
hospital system that owns it. I consider all hospitals covered by the sample that have at
least 25 beds.7 I measure concentration using a Herfindahl index of the number of hospital
beds owned by each hospital system in each MSA in a given year. Hospitals not under the
control of a hospital system are all counted as distinct entities. The OES reports data for
MSAs defined with 1990-Census boundaries from 2001–2003 and 2000-Census boundaries
from 2004–2014 onward due to redefinitions resulting from the 2000 Census. To ensure that
redefinitions of MSA boundaries do not drive my estimates, I use the MSA boundaries based
on the 1990 Census throughout the entire sample. I use 1997 population shares of counties
under each boundary as weights to convert data reported at the 2000-Census boundary
MSAs to 1990-Census boundary MSAs.
6I thank Jean Roth of the NBER for access to these data.
7The sample includes community hospitals, privately owned hospitals, psychiatric and long term care
facilities. This choice is appropriate as all types of hospitals employ RNs.
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To measure merger and acquisition activity, I use data from replication files provided by
Cooper et al. (2019). Cooper et. al. assemble a dataset that records the AHA identifier
of each hospital that is a target in a merger/acquisition and the identity of the hospital
(system) that acquires it. These data record mergers and acquisitions based on information
from the AHA surveys that is cross-referenced and supplemented by news reports and private
data compiled by Irving Levin and Associates, a data source commonly used by industrial
organization economists. Typically, researchers have used data from either the AHA (Lewis
and Pflum, 2017) or Irving Levin and Associates separately; this consolidation provides a
more sound measure of merger activity. The data from Cooper et al. (2019) can be readily
matched to hospitals in the AHA survey, which allows me to identify the markets affected
by merger activity. This dataset’s years of coverage and my desire to explore medium-run
impacts of consolidation on wages dictate the period of study, 2001 to 2014.
2.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Nurses work in a market that is highly concentrated according to conventional measures.
Figure 2.1 plots the distribution of HHI as measured by hospital system ownership of hospital
beds in the MSAs considered in this study in 2001 and 2014. The measure of concentration
that I consider in this paper is a Herfindahl Index — a sum of squared market shares
— constructed based on ownership of hospital beds in each MSA. I use HHI because of its
longstanding use in industrial organization and because of its use in recent papers considering
the impact of concentration on labor markets (Azar et al., 2018). I do not weight these figures;
they the density of the distribution of MSAs. A common threshold for a product market to
be considered highly concentrated is a HHI of .25, a value that corresponds to duopoly in
which both firms split the market exactly.8 This threshold is denoted by the dashed vertical
line in Figure 2.1.
Concentration was high and growing in the market for registered nurses during the period
of study. In 2001, 57% of hospital markets could be considered highly concentrated; this
fraction grew to 61% in 2014.9 Panels C and D of Figure 2.1 show the distribution of
concentration as measured by the employment shares of full time-equivalent registered nurses.
The data to construct this measure come from the AHA annual files which, unlike the OES
data, can be linked to individual employers.10 The concentration of RNs tends to be higher
than that of hospital beds, a finding that follows from the fact that not all hospital facilities
covered in the AHA annual files employ registered nurses. According to this employment-
8I express HHI between 0 and 1 in this paper instead of multiplying by 10,000 for simplicity.
9These figures are slightly lower than those reported in Gaynor et al. (2015) because I drop hospitals
with highly variable reported numbers of beds from the sample; these hospitals tend to be smaller tahn
average.
10The levels of AHA RN employment are lower that those reported in the OES because the AHA covers
hospital based employment and the OES does not. In the rest of the paper, I report OES employment
measures. Results using AHA employment measures are qualitatively identical and quantitatively similar.
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based measure of concentration, 67% of MSAs are “highly concentrated” in 2001. This
fraction rises to 72% of MSAs in 2014.
Employment and hospital bed-based measures of concentration are almost perfectly cor-
related in this study: a regression of employment-based HHI on hospital bed based HHI
returns coefficients of 0.99 (standard error 0.02) and 1.01 (standard error 0.02) in 2001 and
2014, respectively. For this reason, I consider only measures of hospital bed based concen-
tration (“product market concentration”) in the rest of this study. It is important to note
that in other contexts, such as the first chapter of this dissertation, there is a meaningful
distinction between product market and labor market concentration that arises from the
production function used in that particular industry or market. Treating product and la-
bor market measures of concentration as synonymous may not be appropriate in those cases.
Given the observational equivalence between employment and product market concentration
in the context of this paper, I use them interchangeably.
Higher concentration of hospital beds is associated with lower log RN wages across mar-
kets. Figure 2.2 depicts the cross-sectional relationship between the log average RN wage
and the log hospital bed HHI in 254 different MSAs covered by AHA data and OES data in
2001 and 2014. The cross-sectional elasticity of wages with respect to HHI is -.085 (t=-5.1)
and -.119 (t=-5.5) in 2001 and 2014 respectively.11
This study’s main consideration is how changes in concentration affect workers. Table
2.1 shows descriptive statistics that illustrate two key patterns in the market for registered
nurses. First, the OES employment figures show that nurses experienced substantial em-
ployment growth between 2001 and 2014: average employment grew by 27%. Second, the
growth in average employment across markets was accompanied by an average increase in
real wages of 7%. A simple regression of the log change in total employment on the log
change in wages across markets recovers a small “labor supply elasticity” of 0.13 (t=0.72)
that is not statistically distinguishable from zero.
Additional employment information can be obtained by aggregating hospital-level AHA
survey counts of full time equivalent registered nurses to the MSA level. These estimates
reflect the total employment of RNs at hospitals covered by the AHA survey. The growth
in average employment by this measure is similar to that obtained by the OES. I prefer the
OES estimates, as they are the result of survey designed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
to provide accurate market-level estimates, and the AHA survey is not.
Finally, Table 2.1 shows that employment growth was not accompanied by a correspond-
ing rise in average hospital admissions, as measured in the AHA data. I use admissions later
in this paper to construct a measure of nurse effort, admissions per nurse.
2.4 Results
Typically, studies have examined the relationship between concentration and wages across
markets or goods. In the following section, I examine the relationship between changes in
11t-statistics are computed in bivariate regressions not reported here.
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concentration and wages within markets over time.
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy: Long Differences
This section describes the simple correlations that recover the medium-run relationship be-
tween concentration, consolidation, and labor market outcomes in each market. Indexing
markets by m, I estimate the following three regressions:
∆ ln y2001−2014m = β0 + β1∆ lnHHI
2001−2014
m + em (2.1)
∆ lnHHI2001−2014m = pi0 + pi11 {MAm}2001−2014 + um (2.2)
∆ ln y2001−2014m = γ0 + γ11 {MAm}2001−2014 + νm. (2.3)
In these equations, ∆ ln y2001−2014m is the long difference in the log average RN wage y
in market m between 2001 and 2014. ∆HHI2001−2014m is the log change in hospital bed
concentration between 2001 and 2014 for market m, as measured with the AHA annual
survey data. 1 {MAm}2001−2014 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if market m experienced
at least one hospital merger between 2001 and 2014, according to the dataset constructed
by Cooper et al. (2019). I estimate both equations with and without population weights for
each MSA as of 1997.
Many factors affect concentration, wages, and merger activity that are not captured here.
I do not argue that estimates of pi1 and γ1 accurately recover first stage and reduced form
impacts of mergers on concentration and wages and I only use such terminology to guide
the reader. Nevertheless, this empirical exercise represents a unique opportunity to examine
the impact of concentration on wages in a rare context in which we observe employment,
industry concentration in many markets, and merger activity for an entire profession.
2.4.2 Baseline Results: Changes in Concentration and Wages
Panels A, B, and C of Table 2.2 report long difference estimates of Equations 2.1, 2.2, and
2.3, respectively. I estimate these equations on a sample of 254 MSAs for which the data are
available in 2001 and 2014. I begin by focusing on the comparisons between all treated and
all untreated MSAs, which are recorded in Column (1) and Column (2).
In Panel A, columns (1) and (2) show a negative correlation between the growth in hos-
pital bed concentration and RN wage growth. My preferred estimates, weighted by MSA
population in 1997, imply that an increase in concentration growth of 1 percentage point
is associated with a .084 percentage point decrease in RN wage growth. The unweighted
estimates are smaller in magnitude than weighted estimates, falling to 0.03. Both are sta-
tistically significant at the 10% level.
The weighted and unweighted estimates in Column (1) and Column (2) Panel B of
Table 2.2 show a substantive first stage relationship between concentration growth and the
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presence of at least one a hospital merger in an MSA. According to both the weighted and
unweighted estimates, MSAs where there was at least one merger had HHI growth rates that
were approximately 8 ppt higher than those that did not.
Panel C illustrates the reduced form impact of mergers on wage growth. The MSAs in
which a merger occurred had wage growth between 2001 and 2014 that was 2.4 percentage
points lower, according to the weighted estimates in Column (1) Panel C. The unweighted
estimates of the reduced form model are larger in magnitude, at a statistically significant
-0.033. Overall, the magnitudes of coefficients in the weighted and unweighted estimates
imply that first stage and reduced form relationships are larger in magnitude in markets
with lower population.
Scaling the coefficients from the weighted regression indicates that according to the sim-
ple triangular system outlined here, a 1 percentage point increase in market concentration
growth causes a 0.30 percentage point decrease in market average wage growth. The un-
weighted implied two stage least squares estimate is slightly higher, at 0.38. The component
of concentration growth that is related to merger activity leads to a decrease in wages that
is larger in magnitude than the OLS coefficient from Panel A. This pattern suggests that
factors correlated with concentration growth (other than mergers) are associated with higher
wage growth.
The exclusion restriction that merger activity is related to wages only through its impact
on concentration is unlikely to hold in the context of this paper. It is violated if, for example,
merger activity is correlated with anticipated changes in demand for hospital services. For
this reason, I present this scaled estimate for reference but do not consider it to reflect causal
effect.
In light of empirical evidence that changes in market concentration around a threshold
of 2,500 may have larger impacts than changes in concentration among ex ante concentrated
markets (Azar et al., 2018), I estimate versions of Equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 with inter-
actions between treatment variables and an indicator for whether an MSA had a market
concentration in 2001 above the sample median value of 0.29 (a value that is approximately
the same as the threshold for being considered “highly concentrated” in Azar et al., 2018).
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.2 report coefficients from these regressions.
The patterns of the coefficients on the interactions in the weighted and unweighted re-
gressions in Table 2.2 Columns (3) and (4) indicate that the first stage estimates reported
in Table 2.2 are driven by merger activity in MSAs that have ex ante lower concentration.
Due to relatively large standard errors, I am unable to reject the null that nurse wages in
MSAs with ex ante “high” and ex ante “low” concentration are the same.
Overall, the results of the baseline regression model indicate that merger-driven con-
solidation leads to decreases in wages. A simple extension to the baseline model does not
provide evidence that the impact of changes in employer concentration on changes in wages
varies by ex ante levels of employer concentration.
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2.4.3 Event Study Analysis
Work that examines the relationship between mergers and changes in real wages typically
examines treatment and control markets in an event study regression framework (e.g. De-
Pasquale, 2014 and Prager and Schmitt, 2019). Following this work, I estimate the temporal
patterns underlying the reduced form and first stage relationships identified in the previous
section using the following regression:
ymt = δm + ξt +
τ=4∑
τ=−4
ατ1 {t = t∗m + τ}+ emt. (2.4)
In this regression, ymt denotes the outcome of interest (HHI or average wages). t
∗ is the
year in which the first hospital merger in the sample period 2001–2014 occurs for hospital m.
ξt is a year effect, which is identified from MSAs which are never treated in the sample. The
coefficients of interest, the ατ s, index the average within-market difference in the dependent
variable τ years relative to the year of the event t = 0. I estimate equation 2.4 on a balanced
panel of treated markets and I omit the coefficient corresponding to the year before the first
merger, α−1. Because I choose to estimate this regression on a balanced panel of treatment
observations — a choice that yields the simplest interpretation of the regression coefficients
of interest — I eliminate the 141 markets that are treated outside of the years 2005–2008.
That leaves me with a sample of 39 treated MSAs and 74 untreated MSAs for the “full
sample” event study analysis.
Figure 2.3 plots regression estimates and standard errors of ατ from estimates of Equation
2.4 on the sample of 39 treated and 74 untreated MSAs. I weight all regressions by 1997
population. Panel A corresponds to estimates where the dependent variable is log HHI
and Panel B plots estimates from a specification where the dependent variable is the average
market log wage. Panel A shows that a merger is associated with an immediate and persistent
increase in HHI of approximately 10% relative to controls.
Panel B plots the impacts of merger on the within-MSA changes in average RN wages
relative to controls. I find that nurse wages in treated MSAs gradually decline to become
roughly 1.25% lower than those of controls four years after the merger. However, four years
from the event, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality between the treatment and
control groups. The pattern of gradual erosion of nurse wages in treated MSAs follows
intuition about wage-setting in such markets, where it is unlikely that even at hospitals
involved directly in a merger nurses would experience a direct wage cut. These patterns
are consistent with the coefficients uncovered in the long differences estimates of the prior
section.
Panel C shows no discernable difference in total RN employment in MSAs where there
is merger activity, relative to those which do not, in the short run.12
12Note that I measure employment from the OES in this estimate, and thus employment reflects MSA-
wide RN employment regardless of employer.
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The event study results are broadly consistent with those of Prager and Schmitt (2019),
who find limited evidence of wage declines and no evidence of employment changes when
they consider a difference in difference specification comparing all MSAs that experience a
merger to controls that experience no merger.
Prager and Schmitt (2019) emphasizes results from event study models that compare the
subset of hospital mergers in their sample that cause large, immediate changes in concen-
tration to untreated control MSAs. They find that among this subsample of treated MSAs,
mergers lead to a statistically significant 10% average decline in market-level nurse wages
in the four years following the merger. This finding suggests that there is non-linearity in
a causal relationship between employer concentration changes and wage changes, and that
only extreme changes in concentration yield wage responses.13
Figure 2.4 attempts to replicate Prager and Schmitt’s finding in my analysis dataset. I
isolate the quartile of treatment MSAs that experienced the largest immediate increases in
HHI after the merger. I re-estimate Equation 2.4 for the three outcomes of interest using
this refined set of 12 treated MSAs and the same 121 untreated MSAs that served as controls
in the full sample event study analysis. Panel A of Figure 2.4 shows the magnitude of the
first stage relationship is much higher for this sample than the corresponding estimate from
Figure 2.3 Panel A, a pattern that is consistent with correct selection of mergers with large,
immediate concentration impacts.
Panel B shows the wage impacts of the mergers among this subset of treated MSAs
relative to controls. The estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero, but
they are qualitatively consistent with the findings of Prager and Schmitt (2019). Relative to
controls, high-concentration change mergers lead to wage declines of 2.5 percent four years
after the merger, slightly more than the overall treatment mean of 1.25% relative to controls
four years after the merger. This figure is statistically significant. This magnitude is much
lower than the 10% decline over the same time horizon reported by Prager and Schmitt and
it is not statistically significant.
Figure 2.4 Panel C shows that as with the full event study sample, I do not observe
substantive changes in employment for this group of mergers after the merger. However,
this figure presents some evidence of pre-trends in employment changes among the high-
concentrated-change merger MSAs that suggests that the largest instances of consolidation
may be correlated with trends in labor market conditions.
Overall, the qualitative patterns of my results in the high-concentration impact sample
are consistent with Prager and Schmitt (2019) though the magnitude of the wage losses I
estimate are much lower (2.5% compared to 10% four years after the merger) and there is
some evidence of a correlation between employment losses and the inception of a merger in my
sample. Our findings differ for at least three reasons. First, Prager and Schmitt’s wage data
come from a dataset of individual hospital records reported to Medicare. Since hospitals’
revenues are tied to Medicare reimbursement, incentives for hospitals to accurately report
their payroll information accurately to Medicare may be stronger than the OES data used
13They do not find any employment impacts of mergers in this sample.
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here. Second, Prager and Schmitt (2019) analyze a different set of treated and untreated
markets than this paper does. They compare untreated markets with no merger activity
between 2000–2010 to treated markets with a single merger between 2000–2010. Third, it is
unclear whether Prager and Schmitt estimate their event study regression using a balanced
panel of observations, as this chapter does.
2.4.4 Non-wage Outcomes: Admissions, Employment, and Effort
Table 2.3 reports estimates from long difference regressions of, total RN employment, and
a measure of nurse effort (admissions per nurse in a market) on an indicator for whether
the MSA experienced a merger between 2001 and 2014. Following the convention of other
tables, the table reports coefficients from regressions weighted by population and unweighted
results.
I measure changes in the total number of admissions in an MSA by aggregating the total
annual admissions reported in the AHA survey at each hospital in an MSA. The first row
of Table 2.3 reports the coefficient from a regression of the log change in admissions in an
MSA between 2001 and 2014 on an indicator for whether the MSA experienced a merger. I
find that growth in admissions is nearly identical in MSAs with merger activity and those
without.
The second row of Table 2.3 reports point estimates from a long differences regression.
It shows that MSAs with merger activity had rates of employment growth that were 6 ppt
lower than those that did not. These estimates are not statistically significant. DePasquale
(2014) also finds employment impacts of merger activity, although her event study estimates
suggest abrupt employment of a much larger magnitude (10 ppt) than those found in the
event study specification or based on differential growth rates. The findings in this paper
are more consistent with Prager and Schmitt (2019), who find no evidence of employment
effects of mergers, even those that cause large changes in concentration.
Effort responses reflect the differential employment responses. Weighted estimates show
statistically significant 6.4 ppt higher growth in effort, as measured as the log total admissions
per OES nurse in an MSA, in MSAs that experienced a merger (the unweighted figure is 7.8
ppt). The response of increased effort after mergers in the OES is similar to the findings of
Currie et al. (2005). In contrast to their work, this paper finds that the clear driver of effort
increases is lower employment growth in the midst of similar rates of admission growth.
For a subset of years in the AHA survey, hospitals report RN vacancies and whether
they have hired nurses from other countries. My analysis of this subset of years, which I
do not report here, finds no substantive differences in reported vacancies or foreign nurse
employment rates in MSAs with and without merger activity.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper collected data from publicly available sources to assess the medium run impact of
merger-driven consolidation of hospitals on registered nurses in different labor markets. The
findings indicate that consolidation in these already highly-concentrated markets decreases
rates of wage growth among nurses. I find some evidence of lower medium run employment
growth and higher nurse effort in markets where there is merger activity, but that evidence
varies by employment data source.
The findings of this paper echo many of the results of prior work that has examined the
responses of nurses to hospital consolidation, and they are consistent with prior research
that finds evidence that hospitals have wage-setting power in the market for nurses.
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2.6 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Log mean Std. dev. of log
HHI2001 .31 .19 -1.35 .62
HHI2014 .32 .18 -1.29 .59
wage2001 27.09 3.52 3.29 .13
wage2014 29.25 5.75 3.36 .17
emp2001 (OES) 6,500 10,051 8.15 1.05
emp2014 (OES) 8,694 13,247 8.42 1.08
admissions2001 107,008 162,271 10.99 1.02
admissions2014 110,060 156,805 11.01 1.05
Population in 1997 772,589 1,213,241
1 {MAm}2001−2014 0.71
Number of MSAs 254 254 254 254
Notes: Table presents unweighted means and standard deviations of variables of interest for the 254 MSAs
included in the regression sample. See text for descriptions of sources. Wage data are real wages in 2010
dollars. Total RN employment data constructed using the OES.
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Table 2.2: Correlations Between log HHI Growth, Hospital M&A, and log RN Wage Growth,
2001–2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Changes in log Wages and log HHI, 2001-2014 (Eqn 2.1)
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln y2001−2014m
Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted
∆ lnHHI2001−2014m -0.084
∗∗ -0.034∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗
(0.033) (0.020) (0.038) (0.027)
1(HCm)
2001 -0.018 0.005
(0.017) (0.014)
1(HCm)
2001 ×∆ lnHHI2001−2014m 0.141∗∗ 0.079∗
(0.051) (0.043)
N 254 254 254 254
Panel B: Changes in log HHI and Merger activity (Eqn 2.2)
Dependent Variable: ∆ lnHHI2001−2014m
Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted
1 {MAm}2001−2014 0.079∗ 0.086∗∗ 0.083 0.117∗∗
(0.042) (0.034) (0.052) (0.045)
1(HCm)
2001 -0.017 -0.041
(0.050) (0.046)
1(HCm)
2001 × 1 {MAm}2001−2014 -0.120 -0.133∗
(0.074) (0.068)
N 254 254 254 254
Panel C: Changes in log wages and Merger activity (Eqn 2.3)
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln y2001−2014m
Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted
1 {MAm}2001−2014 -0.024 -0.033∗∗ -0.032 -0.035
(0.023) (0.016) (0.038) (0.026)
1(HCm)
2001 -0.019 -0.002
(0.041) (0.034)
1(HCm)
2001 × 1 {MAm}2001−2014 -0.003 0.004
(0.045) (0.034)
N 254 254 254 254
Notes: Table presents coefficients from bivariate regressions from Equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3). Long differ-
ences are measured over the period 2001–2014. See text for variable definitions and data sources. Columns
(1) and (2) report coefficients for pooled sample of al 254 MSAs. Columns (3) and (4) present coefficients
from models with interactions between treatment variables and 1(HCm)
2001, an indicator for whether a
market was “highly concentrated” in 2001. “Weighted” refers to use of MSA 1997 population weights in
regression.
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Table 2.3: Impact of Merger Activity on Admissions, Employment, and Effort
1 {MAm}2001−2014
Weighted Unweighted
Log number of admissions (AHA) 0.002 0.018
(0.031) (0.025)
Log total RN employment (OES) -0.062 -0.061
(0.040) (0.042)
Log effort 0.064∗ 0.078∗
(0.037) (0.039)
Notes: Table reports coefficients and standard errors from bivariate regression of the log change in the
dependent variable denoted in the row from 2001–2014 on an indicator for whether an MSA experienced any
hospital merger between 2001 and 2014. Regression weighted by 1997 MSA population. RN employment
measured from annual OES survey. Results using AHA employment data, not reported here, are qualitatively
similar. “Weighted” refers to use of MSA 1997 population weights in regression.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of hospital bed ownership-based HHI in 2001 and 2014
(a) Panel A: Beds 2001
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(b) Panel B: Beds 2014
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(c) Panel C: RN Employment 2001
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(d) Panel D: RN Employment 2014
0
.0
5
.1
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 M
SA
s i
n 
sa
m
ple
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
FTE RN HHI measured in 2014
Notes: Figure depicts the distribution of HHI as measured by hospital bed ownership as measured by AHA
hospital survey data in 2001 (Panel A) and 2014 (Panel B). Dashed line depicts threshold for being considered
“highly concentrated” as discussed in Azar et al. (2018). Panel C and Panel D depict the distribution of
concentration measured using FTE Registered Nurses recorded in AHA surveys in 2001 and 2014 respectively.
FTE RNs are defined using the conversion from Card and Krueger (1995). Values exceeding one are reported
as one.
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Figure 2.2: Cross-sectional Relationship Between log HHI and log RN Wages, 2001 and 2014
(a) Panel A: 2001
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(b) Panel B: 2014
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Notes: Figure depicts the cross sectional relationship between the log average RN wage and log hospital bed
HHI in 2001 (Panel A) and 2014 (Panel B). Dashed line shows the fitted values from the relevant bivariate
regression, weighted by each MSA’s 1997 population.
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Figure 2.3: Event Study Estimates: Full Sample
(a) Panel A: Log HHI
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(b) Panel B: Log Wages
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(c) Panel C: Log RN Employment
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Notes: Figure depicts estimates of event study coefficients (ατ s from Equation 2.4 for dependent variable
denoted in panel title. Regression sample is comprised of a balanced panel of 39 treatment MSAs whose
first merger occurred between 2005–2008 and 74 control MSAs that did not experience a merger between
2001 and 2014. Black dots are regression coefficients and lines denote 95% confidence intervals derived from
standard errors estimated in regression.
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Figure 2.4: Event Study Estimates: High ∆ HHI Sample
(a) Panel A: Log HHI
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(c) Panel C: Log RN Employment
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Notes: Figure depicts estimates of event study coefficients (ατ s from Equation 2.4 for dependent variable
denoted in panel title. Regression sample is comprised of a balanced panel of 9 treatment MSAs whose first
merger occurred between 2005–2008 and which fall in the top quartile of immediate changes in log HHI
between event time -1 and event time 0 and 74 control MSAs that did not experience a merger between
2001 and 2014. Black dots are regression coefficients and lines denote 95% confidence intervals derived from
standard errors estimated in regression.
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